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Protection of personal information has become a critical issue in the digital world. Many 
companies and service provider websites have adopted privacy policies and practices to 
protect users’ personal information to some extent. In addition, various governments are 
adopting privacy protection legislation. System developers, service providers, and interface 
designers play an important role in determining how to make systems fulfill legal 
requirements and satisfy users. The human factor requirements for effective privacy interface 
design can be categorized into four groups: (1) comprehension, (2) consciousness, (3) 
control, and (4) consent (Patrick & Kenny, 2003).  
Moreover, the type of technology that people are engaged with has a crucial role in 
determining what type of practices should be adopted. As Weiser (1996) envisioned, we are 
now in an “ubiquitous computing” (Ubicomp) era in which technologies such as digital 
tabletops (what Weiser called LiveBoards) are emerging for use in public settings. The 
collaborative and open nature of this type of smart device introduces new privacy threats that 
have not yet been thoroughly investigated and as a result have not been addressed in 
companies’ and governmental privacy statements and legislation. 
In this thesis, I provide an analytical description of the privacy threats unique to tabletop 
display environments. I then present several design suggestions for a tabletop display 
interface that addresses and mitigates these threats, followed by a qualitative evaluation of 






participants have often experienced being shoulder-surfed or had privacy issues when sharing 
information with someone in a collaborative environment. Therefore, they found most of the 
techniques designed in this thesis helpful in providing information privacy for them when 
they are engaged with online social activities on digital tabletops in public settings. Among 
all of the proposed tested designs, the first three have proven to be effective in providing the 
required privacy. However, designs 4 and 5 had some shortfalls that made them less helpful 
for participants. The main problem with these two designs was that participants had difficulty 
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Chapter 1. Introduction  
 
Back in 1996, Weiser and Brown (1996) discussed major trends in computing (Figure 1.1). 
They argued, “The important waves of technological change are those that fundamentally 
alter the place of technology in our lives. What matters is not technology itself, but its 
relationship to us (Page 1).” They predicted embedded microscopic computers in walls, 
chairs, clothing and many other places in our lives to the extent that we can call it “calm 
technology” (Weiser & Brown, 1996) meaning that things around us are informing without 
overburdening and recede into the background of our lives (Weiser & Brown, 1996) 
Weiser and Brown’s era of ubiquitous computing has largely already been realized. 
Weiser proposed three forms of ubiquitous smart devices: tabs, pads and boards (Weiser, 
2002). Tabs are wearable centimeter-sized devices and Pads are decimeter-sized devices we 
already see everywhere from iPads and iPhones to Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs). The 
third type is an emerging popular meter-sized interactive display device Weiser called Live 
Board. Live board or what is referred to as a digital table or tabletop display nowadays is the 
focus of this thesis and my investigation of privacy. 
Nowadays people widely use smartphones and personal computers but they are not able 
to easily connect to each other or collaborate. As thoroughly discussed in Section 3.1, there 
are a lot of situations where it is useful to use digital tables instead of private devices such as 






work. Instead of individuals working independently on their own devices or workstations, 
people can collaborate across a shared display through touch and gesture-based interaction 
while maintaining eye contact and engaging in conversation. Additionally, tabletop displays 
offer many new possibilities for attracting the attention of passers-by in a public setting, such 
as museums or malls, due to their large size and their ability to support many people 











However, while these devices offer the promise of new styles of interaction, they also 
introduce many potential threats to privacy. When collaborating around a table in a public 
place, a stranger walking by might be able to see what a person is typing in or entering into 
their device (shoulder-surfing) or one group could finish using the table and walk away, but 






forget to log off or otherwise secure the machine so that another person can use or view their 
personal data. Additionally, within a group it may also be difficult to share information 
without unintentionally revealing other personal data. For instance, if one group member 
opens a message in Facebook, they may inadvertently show their group members other 
messages or personal information while navigating to that message.  
To investigate privacy issues unique to the use of digital tables in a public setting, and to 
help privacy legislation compliance surrounding this new technology, I designed and 
evaluated a social networking application for use in a public space and explored associated 
threats of the application’s interface design using an existing framework for designing 
software applications to support privacy. The framework comprises four core concepts: 
Comprehension, Consciousness, Control, and Consent.  
An online social network (OSN) is chosen as an example application to test privacy 
concerns on a digital tabletop because online social networks’ privacy practices1 have always 
been controversial. Not only do they sometimes breach industry standards and government 
regulations but they also often violate their own privacy policies (Steel & Vascellaro, 2010). 
According to polls (Steel & Vascellaro, 2010); (Lippman, 2010), people are very concerned 
                                                 
1 There is an important difference between privacy practices and policies; a privacy policy is a statement that 
companies put in their websites or application information page for users to read about how their personal 
information is being collected, used and disclosed. However, this does not mean the company has privacy 
practices in place that comply with the stated policies. One way to address this problem is trusted third-party 
involvement that assures the privacy practices of the company comply with their privacy policies (Boritz, No, & 






about the privacy of their information and potential cybercrimes that threaten them and their 
children. Over time, regulatory actions and privacy frameworks have emerged from legal 
cases and complaints to address people’s concerns. There are regulations in different 
countries, such as Canada and the United States, that regulate the information rights of 
children under 13 (OECD, PIPEDA, FTC’s FIP), as well as the flow of trans-border 
information. However, the existing legislation does not include new privacy concerns 
emerging with the use of new technologies such as digital tabletops.  
The focus of this research is on anticipated privacy threats associated with using 
Facebook as an information-sharing website on digital tabletops in public settings. Before 
choosing Facebook, different information sharing websites such as Twitter, Google+, and 
LinkedIn were considered for this research. Facebook was chosen not only for being the most 
commonly used online social network, but also for being more aligned with the purpose of 
this research. Facebook offers a wider range of features for sharing various types of 
information such as photos, messages, links, and videos, compared to alternative social 
networks. For example, LinkedIn is limited to career-related information and Twitter is 
mostly used to share thoughts and quotes. Nevertheless, future research can consider and 
compare these and other existing websites. 
 I then present several design ideas based on the four elements of comprehension, 
consciousness, control and consent that comply with already-existing laws and regulations to 
better protect people’s privacy.  I then present the results of a qualitative study in which I 






It is also notable that, in this study, I neither rely on the fact that these concepts have 
equal importance, nor on the fact that one is more important than the other in addressing 
privacy issues. It may be true that one has more importance than others in improving 
people’s information-privacy needs, but further research is needed to validate this hypothesis. 
 
1.1 Motivation 
In this thesis I examine how the interface of information-sharing websites used on digital 
tabletops in public settings can be designed to mitigate and address unique privacy threats. 
There are two primary motivations:  
1. Various governments are adopting privacy protection legislation to address different 
aspects of personal information usage. There are different protective guidelines in 
well-known privacy frameworks regarding dealing with children under 13 or trans-
border flows of personal data, but less attention has been paid to new emerging 
technologies and their potential for privacy invasion; for example, new technologies 
such as digital tabletop displays in public settings and social networking applications 
used in conjunction with such devices. 
2. A significant element in the consideration of privacy threats is the mechanisms 
through which people can interact with their personal data. When people are provided 
with new technology for sharing and working with their own data in a public setting, 
many privacy issues can be addressed through the appropriate design of an interface. 






interaction techniques that can provide faster, easier manipulation of digital artifacts; 
however, it is an open research question whether and how an interface can be 
designed to provide people with the ability to share their personal information in a 
safe, controlled, and comfortable way. 
 
There has been little to no research addressing the above-mentioned issues. This thesis 
suggests interface designs that can be used on digital tabletops in public settings to enhance 
the actual and perceived privacy of personal information and to bring important 
considerations to policy makers’ attention to enable digital tabletops to become available to 
and to be used safely by everyone. 
 
1.2 Scope 
The data that feeds this research consists of two main parts. One is related to the privacy 
domain with regard to collection, use, and disclosure of personal information, including 
privacy frameworks and the privacy policy of Facebook as the information-sharing website 
used in this research project. By comparing privacy frameworks with Facebook’s privacy 
policy, some privacy gaps will be identified and addressed by the proposed interface design 
models.  
The other source used in this thesis is a body of literature on collaborative and co-located 
tasks on interactive displays in public settings from the domain of human-computer 






privacy invasions. These possibilities along with characteristics of these surfaces will be 
examined and new privacy threats will be identified. Then privacy-enhancing design 
considerations will be introduced, followed by suggested design models. Figure 1.2 depicts a 
summary of the thesis workflow and how each section contributes to the thesis.






1.3 Open Research Problems 
Privacy policy and related threats have been addressed in different domains such as e-
commerce and business-marketing (Boritz, No, & Sundarraj, August 25-27, 2009); (Charters, 
2002) and even online social networks with respect to privacy breaches that have been 
controversial lately (Bardeesy, 2009); (Steel & Vascellaro, 2010). In the human-computer 
interaction domain, many researchers have worked on how they can technically (through 
hardware or software) address security issues on digital tabletops (De Luca & Frauendienst, 
2008); (Hagen & Eika Sandnes, 2001). However, no research has been done from the human 
factors point of view, and on the elements that should be considered when designing a system 
to protect personal information privacy.  
      This research is different form other research, first because it is focused on digital 
tabletops and particularly information-sharing applications and bridges work between the 
human-computer interaction and privacy policy domains.  
 
1.4 Contributions 
The main contribution of this thesis is to support the design of online social networks for 
digital tables in public places that have an improved level of privacy. I make the following 
specific contributions: 
• A better understanding of the privacy threats unique to online social networks on 






• A description of how to embed privacy requirements into the design of digital 
tabletop systems through a set of interface designs 
• The implementation of a set of privacy-improved designs for digital tabletops in 
public settings 
• The results of a study evaluating the effectiveness of the designs in improving 
comprehension, consciousness, control and consent. 
1.5 Thesis Outline 
Chapter 1 presents the motivation and research objectives. Chapter 2 reviews previously-
published literature on digital tabletops, privacy, and work that addresses privacy issues 
when using digital tabletops in public settings. Following that, Chapter 3 compares 
statements from Facebook’s privacy policy with principles of privacy frameworks from the 
literature and identifies potential threats in both traditional desktop environments, and those 
unique to tabletop settings in co-located and public environments. The threats are 
communicated through different scenarios.  
Chapter 4 describes some interface design ideas for improving user-interface compliance 
with privacy legislations along with pros and cons of each idea, based on the analysis of 
threats from Chapter 3. Then, Chapter 5 presents the results of an informal laboratory study 
in which the proposed interface design ideas were evaluated to better understand the 
strengths and weaknesses of the designs presented in Chapter 4. Finally, the research 
objectives that are met, concluding remarks, and recommendations for future work are 






Chapter 2. Related Literature 
 
This research bridges two primary domains of active research: human-computer interaction 
(HCI) and privacy policy legislation. More specifically, the research focuses primarily on the 
subdomain of tabletop display interaction within HCI and legislation specific to information-
sharing applications. Before getting into how privacy principles can be embedded in the 
design of information-sharing systems for digital tabletops to ensure fair information 
collection, use, and disclosure, we need to know what digital tabletops are, what privacy is, 
and how privacy differs when we are using a digital tabletop in a public setting.  
Therefore, this chapter provides an overview of the literature relevant to understanding 
the above-mentioned domains. The background presented here is divided into three main 
categories. First is an overview of different kinds and characteristics of digital tabletops as an 
emerging technology. This is followed by a discussion of privacy definitions and different 
privacy frameworks. Finally, examples of privacy issues unique to digital tabletops addressed 
by other researchers are discussed and core elements of a privacy-enhanced design are 
introduced. 
 
2.1 Digital Tabletops 
Digital tabletops are interactive horizontal digital displays that enable multi-touch interaction 
with digital information and media for one or multiple users. Scott et al. (2003) classified 






1) Digital Desks which are intended to integrate digital media with traditional desks.  
2) Workbenches that are top-projected virtual reality environments. Some 
characteristics that distinguish a workbench from other virtual reality 
environments such as CAVEs are its flat and limited-size display. 
3) Drafting tables are meant to replace an artist’s or drafter’s table which has an 
angled surface and are usually used by one person at a time. 
4) Collaboration tables are horizontal computer displays with an interactive touch-
sensitive area that serves as the surface of the table and are intended for use by 
several people at the same time. They allow people to interact with them directly 
by touching, gesturing, etc. or indirectly with input devices such as a mouse, 
keyboard, etc. and are applicable for group collaborations in educational settings, 
workplaces or public places by providing a shared environment2. They are also a 
blend of the traditional with the modern, allowing the power of today’s computer 
systems to be combined with the natural environment of a physical table, along 
with all of the intuitive understanding of face-to-face communication and 
collaborative strategies that accompany such an environment  (Scott, T. 
Carpendale, & Inkpen, 2004). 
In this thesis, I direct my attention to digital tabletops as collaboration tables (category 4) 
(Figure 2.1). The reason for this choice is that among the categories above, collaboration 
                                                 
2 Shared environment is a technical term applied to any system or device that has an environment where people 






tables are the most suitable for collaboration activities, especially in public settings, because 











          
In spite of the fact that digital tabletops offer several advantages for collaborative work, 
they have some technical barriers. For example, a picture that was right side up may be up-
side down for other users standing in the other side of the table. Several researchers worked 
on different mechanisms to overcome these barriers. Hancock et al. (2006) identified five 
different rotation and translation mechanisms, investigated which ones are more suitable for 
digital tabletops and discussed the tradeoffs between using any of the techniques. Parker et 
al.  (2006) investigated different interaction methods on digital tabletops including fingers, 






stylus, mouse, trackballs, and tangible artifacts and introduced a novel interaction technique 
called TractorBeam. This technique enables users to interact with closer objects as well as  
selecting distant targets by seamlessly switching between these interaction methods. 
Moreover, there are also several non-technical barriers as well. When working in 
collaborative environments, there are often times when accessing personal or private 
information is required; this is also true for working on a digital tabletop. For example, when 
in a collaborative group an email or message needs to be accessed to show to the group, the 
user might not be comfortable revealing other information in that email, such as the name of 
the sender or a portion of the message. Therefore, there are some information privacy 
considerations specific to digital tabletops that will be discussed in more detail in Section 2.3. 
   
2.2 Privacy 
Before discussing privacy concerns specific to digital tabletop environments, it is useful to 
consider privacy frameworks in general. Privacy has different meanings in different domains. 
One of the very first privacy definitions was provided by Judge Louis Brandeis in 1890 
which stated that privacy is “the right to be let alone” (Brandeis & Warren, 1890). There are 
many other definitions such as:  
“Privacy is the ability of an individual or group to seclude them or information about 
themselves and thereby reveal them selectively. Privacy is sometimes related to anonymity, 
the wish to remain unnoticed or unidentified in the public realm” (Wikiquote). “A capability 






“The selective control of access to the self” (Altman, 1975). “The claim of individuals, 
groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent 
information about them is communicated to others” (Westin, 1967). However, the following 
is the closest definition of privacy to the context of this thesis and also to the spirit of the 
privacy legislation used in this research: 
 
“Privacy is the right of an individual to determine to what degree he or she is willing to 
disclose personal or other information about him- or herself. When such information is 
provided to other entities, individuals, or organizations, this right extends to the collection, 
distribution, and storage of that information (Boritz, No, & Sundarraj, August 25-27, 
2009).” 
 
Governments of some countries (e.g., European Union, Canada, Australia, and Switzerland) 
have adopted privacy protection laws that are imposed through governmental bodies with 
supervisory powers. However, they are more focused on sensitive sectors such as health care 
and financial services, unless there is an extreme breach of privacy such as RealNetworks 
(Macavinta, 1999), DoubleClick (Charters, 2002), ChoicePoint (Kane & Hines, 2005), and 
most importantly, online social networks such as Facebook, whose privacy practices have 
always been controversial. Not only do they often breach industry standards and government 






According to polls (Steel & Vascellaro, 2010); (Lippman, 2010), people are concerned about 
the privacy of their information and potential cybercrimes that threaten them and their 
children. Because of such concerns, some governments (including the Canadian 
government), monitor the privacy policies and practices of controversial non-public bodies to 
make sure they comply with privacy regulations (e.g., PIPEDA). However, in spite of all the 
governmental supervision, there has been little guidance made available to designers and 
programmers on how to implement such systems3.  
As will be discussed in the next section, some prior research has investigated privacy 
issues associated with OSNs and the methods to be used to minimize threats in such contexts 
(Gross & Acquisti, 2005); (Stutzman & Kramer-Duffield, 2010), but there has been virtually 
no research on privacy risks associated with using OSNs on digital tabletops in public 
settings and how to address them by embedding the privacy requirements into the design of 
the system. This research is an attempt to address the existing gap and focuses on the use of 
Facebook as an online social network on a digital tabletop in public settings and the privacy 
threats associated with this environment. 
2.2.1 Privacy Frameworks 
To be able to embed the privacy requirements into the interface design of the system, it is 
necessary to identify and understand the privacy principles that are essential to privacy 
frameworks and that will be used to evaluate compliance by a particular system. Most of the 
                                                 
3 Recently Ontario’s privacy commissioner initiated “Privacy by Design” as a philosophy of embedding privacy 






principles of privacy frameworks are abstracted from legal complaints and codes (Patrick & 
Kenny, 2003), and are designed to govern the collection, use and disclosure of personal data. 
Personal data (AKA Personally Identifiable Information, or PII) can be any data that either 
directly or indirectly through combination with other data identify an individual. Privacy 
frameworks distinguish the requirements and responsibilities of a “Data Controller” who is 
knowledgeable to decide about the contents and use of personal data and a “Data Processor” 
who can be an entity inside the organization responsible for all or part of processing activities 
or a separate legal entity processing personal data on behalf of the Data Controller. 
There are different privacy frameworks, some of which are for particular countries or are 
focused on a special aspect of privacy principles. In this section, I describe the three privacy 
frameworks (OECD, PIPEDA, and FTC’s FIP) that were used as a basis for analysis in this 
thesis (see Appendix I for a full description of each). Their principles are later mapped with 
the core concepts of privacy-enhanced design (Section 2.3). Also there is a full analysis of 
Facebook’s privacy policy mapped to the privacy principles of all of these frameworks in 
Appendix II. 
OECD Privacy Framework 
The OECD privacy principles (OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and 
Transborder Flows of Personal Data) were developed in the 1970s by the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and development (OECD) (Development, Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development, 2012). OECD is an organization officially 






Organization provides a setting where governments compare policy experiences, seek 
answers to common problems, identify good practices and coordinate domestic and 
international policies (Development, OECD Privacy Principles, 2010).” OECD Privacy 
Principles form an internationally and commonly-used privacy framework. The OECD 
guidelines are a global benchmark for privacy protection and serve as the basis of many other 
privacy practice programs and frameworks, as well as being a recommended model for 
privacy legislation in many countries (Boritz, No, & Sundarraj, August 25-27, 2009). 
A list of eight OECD Privacy Principles and guidelines that should be regarded as 
minimum standards and are complementary to other measures to protect personal 
information privacy and individual liberties (OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy 
and Transborder Flows of Personal Data) can be found in Appendix I.   
PIPEDA Privacy Framework 
The Personal Information Protection and Electronic Document Act (PIPEDA) incorporates 
the key elements of the privacy code of the Canadian Standards Association (CSA). PIPEDA 
governs private-sector organizations such as charities, corporations, and partnerships, 
including online businesses. It also includes provisions for electronic document use. PIPEDA 
is a law that gives individuals control over how their personal information is handled in the 
private sector. Personal information is information that can be related to an identifiable 
individual, or can be used to directly or indirectly identify an individual (Boritz & No, 2011).  
 The law consists of 10 principles of fair information practices that are the essentials for 






10 privacy principles are defined in the section “Model Code for the Protection of Personal 
Information” of the PIPEDA Act (Department of Justice, 2012) and can be found in 
Appendix I. 
FTC Privacy Framework  
The United States Federal Trade Commission (FTC) was created in 1914 to protect 
customers against fraud, deception and unfair business practices, to maintain fair 
competition in the marketplace, and to ultimately advance its performance in 
organizations. The FTC prepared and collected a set of documents, reports, and guidelines 
regarding the best practices to collect, use, and disclose personal information. The core 
principles to all these documents are five main privacy protection principles (Fair 
Information Practices or FIP) (See Appendix I). 
The FTC recently expanded its final privacy report and added some amendments 
including “Privacy by Design” (Cavoukian, 2012)  . It explains that companies should think 
about and include customers’ privacy in every stage of building a system or product (Federal 
Trade Commission, 2012). 
While there has been significant work in the domain of privacy policy legislation, there 
has also been some work in the domain of HCI that addresses or discusses privacy issues. In 
the next section, previous research that explores the issue—i.e. privacy specifically on 
digital tabletops—is discussed and then an analysis of the above privacy frameworks is 







2.3 Digital Tabletops and Privacy 
One appeal of digital tabletops is the social dimension; they enable interaction among 
and between people by having an open and collaborative interactive surface. However, 
interaction between people that is mediated by technology is prone to both intentional 
and unintentional invasions of privacy. With the emerging popularity of the digital 
tabletop and public display devices (Patrick and Kenny, 2003), it is becoming more 
critical to provide a method to protect private information from being seen by the other 
people at the table. There are many different types of information that may appear on a 
tabletop, ranging from personal sites on the Internet, to passwords and pin codes 
involving different levels of concern about privacy. Each of these levels may require 
different types of privacy protection. In this section I provide the context from the 
related work on different techniques and technologies that address privacy issues on 
digital tabletops to identify necessary vocabulary and to also position my research in the 
context of the significant amount of related work:  
 
Hardware-based Technologies 
Some researchers have already developed hardware-based technologies to hide or show 
information to individuals for supporting people’s privacy in a co-located collaborative 
setting. For example, Chan et al. (2008) developed a privacy-enhanced digital tabletop 
composed of two types of displays, the table surface and a virtual panel. The virtual panel is 






those within a limited range of the viewing angle. In this scenario, when the virtual panel is 
placed correctly, other viewers behind or next to the desired viewer, will only view a partial, 
distorted or blind view of the content being displayed. In their study, they gave the example 
of a poker application, which requires that each player can see only their own cards.  
Scott et al. (2003) suggested some guidelines that technology should support for 
tabletops. One of the guidelines is to support transitions between personal and group work. 
In this case, they have suggested that separate personal displays may be used, but also 
caution that separate devices often hinder interpersonal interaction.  
Skinput (Harrison, Tan, & Morris, 2010) was developed as a method to use the human 
body as an input device. The device is a wearable bio-acoustic sensing array that was built 
into an armband. One appeal of this technology is that the body has roughly two square 
meters of external surface area, and the other is that most of it is easily accessible by our 
hands. In their experiment, they attached the Skinput device to the arms of the participants 
and displayed the images on their forearms and palms. The users then used their other hands 
to push the buttons on their skin, resulting in data input. This technology would be very 
helpful when working at a digital tabletop unit and entering a password is required. If the 
hand or leg is used as the input device, it can be well protected and shielded from the eyes of 







Software-based Technologies  
Another category is software-based techniques that allow people to protect their 
information. Apted and Kay (2006) describe their experience with Cruiser, a multi-user, 
gestural collaborative digital media to share media such as photos on a tabletop. They had a 
specific mode that allowed personal space, where objects are colored triangular elements that 
are drawn on the display to illustrate an area exclusive to each user. While in this mode, other 
users are not able to access or make changes to anything in the designated area, nor are they 
allowed to add or remove objects from someone else’s personal space.   
Territoriality was examined in Scott et al. (2004), where they found that collaborators 
tend to use three types of tabletop territories to divide the tabletop. This includes group space 
at the center of the table, personal space generally right in front of each individual and 
storage space, which can usually be found off to the side. When considering options to 
protect private information on a tabletop, it is important to keep people’s natural desire for 
partitioning the space in mind. Another factor to consider is the shape of the table. A study 
was performed in a school library that showed students would avoid round tables because it 
is more difficult to partition them into individual workspaces, so they often chose the 
rectangular tables (Thompson, 1973). 
      Hagen & Sandnes (2001) discussed anaglyph image information hiding to be used for 
information hiding on digital tabletops. In this method a pair of glasses that has a unique 
color will be given to participants. If an observer is wearing red glasses, information in red 






without others noticing. Still the method is limited and does not guarantee privacy because at 






Figure 2.2 Filtering the information with anaglyth images 4 
 
Hand Gesture Techniques 
The use of hand gestures has also been considered as a technique to protect personal 
information. Wu & Balakrishnan (2003) examined several different multi-finger and whole 
hand gestures that can be used for multi-user tabletop displays. One of the whole hand gestures 
was the horizontal hand, where the user would place their hand horizontally along the tabletop. 
Although the gesture was developed originally to display the properties of the selected objects 
for this application, it was noted that users could use this technique to protect information from 
others. The hand acts as a barrier, and in order to see what the user is hiding, one would have to 
stand up and intentionally look over their hand, thereby breaking social protocol.  
                                                 






    Another interesting idea from this work was the tilted horizontal hand, where the user 
would place their hand horizontally on the table, but tilt it away from other users. Since the 
setup used top-down projection, they were able to display information onto the palm of the 
hand. In this case, it is possible to tilt the hand towards oneself to enter private information, and 









Figure 2.3 Two people using multi-finger and whole hand gestures5 
 
2.4 A Framework for Designing Systems to Support Privacy 
In addition to the development of techniques and technologies to address privacy concerns, 
other researchers have also explored how to apply privacy legislation to design concepts. The 
idea is that the user interface of a computing system can play an advantageous role in 
avoiding unintentional intrusions on privacy (Denning & Branstad, 1996).  
                                                 






Kobsa (2001); (2002) analysed how personalization services such as websites might 
worry some users since they sometimes collect personal information implicitly—for instance 
by tracking usage patterns.  He then examined implications of privacy laws and developed 
some design guidelines to help personalization websites build privacy-sensitive systems. 
“These guidelines include suggestions such as to: (1) inform users that personalization is 
taking place, and describe the data that is being stored and the purpose of the storage, (2) get 
users’ consent to the personalization, and (3) protect users’ data with strong security 
measures (Kobsa, 2002).”  
Patrick & Kenny (2003) also discussed specific interface techniques that comply with 
the spirit of the European Privacy Directive. They introduced several human factor 
requirements that need to be met for an effective privacy interface design. These 
requirements are fundamental to this thesis and form the basis of the designs categorized into 
four groups: comprehension, consciousness, control, and consent (Patrick & Kenny, 2003). 
Below each of these categories is discussed: 
Comprehension: In the category of comprehension, design requirements suggest that 
the user should understand the context of the domain and comprehend when a process such 
as data collection or consent is happening. One method to support comprehension is to 
mandate both traditional and digital training. Traditional methods include classroom training, 
manuals, and demonstrations which are time-consuming and in most cases expensive. Today, 
with the emergence of information systems and online applications, much effort is devoted to 






Another form of informal training is built-in help systems that provide short, targeted 
information based on the context. Patrick & Kenny (2003) discuss other forms of 
comprehension methods that are used in HCI research, namely mental models and 
metaphors. In this research comprehension means the user should understand or has the data 
collection, use and disclosure practices that happen when using a social network’s 
information-sharing website (Facebook, in this research) on a digital tabletop.  For example, 
people should understand when they are giving consent, when their information is being 
collected, and how their information is being handled. 
Consciousness: In the category of consciousness, interface design requirements suggest 
that the interface should make people aware or get their attention, especially at specific times. 
Consciousness and comprehension are interrelated and sometimes interchangeable in the 
sense that the user has to have some knowledge and understanding about the context before 
conscious attention is useful. In this thesis, consciousness refers to bringing knowledge and 
understanding to the attention of the user about collection, use, and disclosure of personal 
data and related privacy risks.  
“The human-factors discipline has a long history of designing systems in a way that   
makes users aware of certain things at the right time (Wickens & Hollands, 2000)”. There are 
various interface techniques that address consciousness such as pop-up windows, “help 
assistants”, and many others. For some techniques, the user has to acknowledge receiving 
and understanding the message in order to proceed, while others just give suggestions or 






that use display characteristics such as color, sound, and placement of features and 
arrangement of interface components to have the maximum effectiveness. For example, 
displaying text in red can draw attention or playing a sound when filling out a form that 
collects data to make people aware of what is happening.      
Control: In the category of control, design requirements suggest that the interface 
should provide users with the ability to control processing of their personal information. As 
with consciousness, control is also interrelated with both comprehension and consciousness. 
In other words, the user has to be aware that they are supposed to do something 
(consciousness) and know what to do (comprehension) in order to perform the action 
(control). For example, if a website’s privacy practices do not comply with their privacy 
statement, first the user should know what data collection purposes are not legal and not 
mentioned in the website’s privacy policy. Then they should notice and become aware that, 
for instance, the website is collecting their information for purposes other than those 
mentioned. Assuming all the conditions are valid, the user has to have the ability to control 
the way their PII is handled or should be able to object to the data collection practice. 
There are some important concepts that contribute to the effectiveness of the control 
factor. One such concept is affordance (Norman, 1990)—to design an interface component to 
have attributes that allow people to know how it is used. If it is complicated, then it will not 
be effective and users may have problems using it. For example, in order to log out of a 
system, it should be obvious how, rather than providing this feature through a hidden button 






Consent: In the category of consent, design requirements suggest that if a user is giving 
consent to the processing of their personal information it should be informed, unambiguous 
and specific. The most common method of getting consent is through a “User Agreement” or 
“Terms of Service”, which the user has to agree to in order to proceed. There are some 
guidelines for creating click-through agreements and obtaining consent that were developed 
by the Cyberspace Law Committee for the American Bar Association, such as the 
opportunity to review terms, the ability to reject terms, the ability to print terms, and the 
opportunity to correct errors.  
In order to make sure all the circumstances are covered, many click-through agreements 
tend to be complex, lengthy and written in “legalese” resulting in users having difficulty 
understanding the document and its legal terms (comprehension problem) and then agreeing 
to the term without considering the terms and consequences (consciousness problem). People 
have constrained ability to process large data at once and this ability is affected by a number 
of factors. Interface techniques that are sensitive to human cognitive ability are useful and 
can provide better decision-making and control. 
The above-mentioned elements are the core concepts of a privacy-enhanced design 
(Patrick & Kenny, 2003). In Table 2.1, elements of each privacy framework discussed in this 






Table 2. 1 Comparison of privacy principles and core concepts of privacy-enhanced design 
PIPEDA OECD FTC’s FIP Core Concepts 
Accountability Accountability  NA NA 
Identifying Purpose Purpose Specification Notice/Awareness Comprehension, 
Consciousness 
Consent Connection Limitation Choice/Consent Comprehension, 
Consent 
Limiting Collection Connection Limitation NA Comprehension, 
Consent 
Limiting Use, Disclosure 
and Retention 
Use Limitation NA Comprehension, 
Consent 
Accuracy Data Quality Integrity/Security NA 
Safeguards Security Safeguard Integrity/Security NA 
Openness Openness Notice/Awareness Comprehension, 
Consciousness, 
Control 
Individual Access Individual participation Access/Participation Comprehension,  
Consciousness, 
Control 






Chapter 3. Identifying Privacy Threats 
of Digital Tabletops in Public Settings  
 
3.1 Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter 2, there has been a significant amount of research on technologies 
and techniques that addresses privacy issues relevant to digital tabletops. However, 
depending on what application is being used and in what situation, the privacy threats can 
change. Therefore, in order to distinguish the type of threats that can occur in this specific 
research setting (the use of OSNs on digital tabletops in public settings) three factors of 
privacy (location, screen size, data accessibility) are mapped in a 3D space. The points in this 
space represent different scenarios involving technology, each with unique threats to privacy.  
The focus of this thesis is on applications with public data accessibility (e.g., Facebook) 
on large display devices (such as digital tabletops) when being used in public locations (such 
as shopping malls). The privacy threats specific to this setting will be identified by presenting 
scenarios addressing both desktop computers and digital tabletops to better distinguish the 
respective threats. Finally, based on the identified unique threats to this research setting, two 







3.2 Factors Affecting Privacy 
There are a number of factors, which may influence people’s information privacy. (See 
Boritz & No (2011) for a comprehensive discussion of such factors.) Three of these factors 
are discussed in this thesis (Figure 3.1): location, screen size and data security. 
Location: Exposure to privacy threats differs depending on where a person is 
physically located. This can vary from being in a very private place such as a corner 
in one’s bedroom to a very crowded public place such as a busy shopping mall with a 
lot of unfamiliar people walking around. 
Screen size: The smaller the device’s screen, the harder it is to view the information, 
especially from farther away. Smaller screens in electronic devices reduce the 
visibility especially from farther distances and can make shoulder-surfing more 
difficult. Also, it makes it easier for the user to hide or face down small devices such 
as cell phones or laptop computers. Therefore, the size of the device’s screen can play 
an important role in the information privacy of users.  
Data accessibility: Information privacy concerns vary significantly when typing a 
piece of text on a personal computer versus commenting on a public page in an online 
social network. Generally activities on public websites are not as safe as working on 
one’s own document offline. There are bugs and privacy breaches associated with 
public websites that makes them prone to privacy invasions.  
Figure 3.1 depicts the three-dimensional space generated by these three factors. Each 






varies drastically between examples such as working in an online social network on a 
digital tabletop in a public setting versus listening to music on a cellphone while in bed.
Figure 3.1 The three factors of privacy (location, screen size, data accessibility) mapped in a 3D space.  






3.3 Privacy Threats on Digital Tabletops 
In the previous section, a 3D space of possible threats was defined.  Df(location, medium, 
data accessibility) and Tf(location, large, data accessibility) are identified to better distinguish 
between threats on desktop computers and digital tabletops.  Since the focus of this research 
is on digital tabletops, in this section I only discuss two main categories of privacy threats on 
digital tabletops that cover all the threats recognized in the previous section: 1.shoulder-
surfing and 2.information sharing.  
Shoulder Surfing 
A simple and very common threat when using digital tabletops in a public setting is 
called shoulder surfing. This situation involves someone looking over another person’s 
shoulder, and in the process obtaining access to personal information, such as passwords or 
private emails. It can be done either intentionally or unintentionally by actively trying to spy 
on the information from a nearby spot or just noticing information by passing by someone 
who is working on a digital tabletop. 
      The size of digital tabletops makes shoulder surfing particularly easy to do. If the digital 
tabletop is located in a public and crowded place, this problem is exacerbated, since it is hard 
to notice whether someone is actually looking or not. 
Information Sharing  
Digital tabletops can be a useful collaborative tool, for instance for a group of people to 
plan a trip or organize a shopping adventure. This collaborative process can often involve the 






own set of tools such as paper, laptops, smartphones, etc. 
One consequence of sharing is that everything on the display becomes visible to 
everyone in the group. There may be a situation in which some contents should not be shared 
with all the participants but only one or a few of them. Examples of this type of information 
can be email and system notifications. In other situations, information may not be private but 
it is also not directly relevant to the discussion or may even be distracting. For instance when 
a person wants to show a specific line of text from a large document, they may prefer to 
show the final result to the audience instead of scrolling many pages in front of them.  
 
3.4 Facebook Analysis 
To demonstrate and evaluate interface designs to address privacy threats unique to digital 
tables in a public setting, I use the example of the social networking application Facebook. 
To set the stage for the remainder of the thesis, in this section I first provide the motivation 
for using a social networking application as the focus of my analysis, then use the framework 
(Patrick & Kenny, 2003) described in Chapter 2 to highlight threats to privacy that exist in 
the desktop version of Facebook. I then highlight new threats that would occur were the same 
policy to be used for the same (unmodified) application on a digital table in a public setting. 
In the following chapter, I will describe how to design interfaces for digital tabletop 






Motivation for the use of Facebook 
I chose Facebook as my illustrative social network because it is the most widely used 
social networking application and is often criticized for its privacy policies. However, at first 
consideration, one might question why a person might want to use a social networking site on 
a large table in a public setting, but there are several scenarios where I hypothesize such a 
device might be considered useful. For example, at a furniture store, a person may wish to 
show the retailer some pictures of their home from Facebook to see which sofa matches their 
wallpaper. If the person does not have any smart device with him at the store, he may be 
willing to use the digital tabletop placed in the store to access his Facebook account. Another 
example might be in a hotel, when a family decides to plan a day and the daughter of the 
family remembers a picture of her friend on Facebook travelling to a beautiful park. If they 
don’t have their personal electronic devices with them, she may use the digital tabletop 
located in the hotel lobby. Yet a third example could involve an ad-hoc encounter between 
friends at a mall, where one wishes to show the other something from her Facebook page and 
a convenient way may be to use a digital tabletop in the mall that is located near the a 
customer service booth. 
These scenarios illustrate situations in which accessing a social networking application 
on a large screen may be useful; however, the collaborative and open nature of digital 
tabletops increases threats to privacy already present in the current Facebook system, and 
may make people wary of using a digital table in this manner. For example, people might not 






number or to enter their password in front of a friend while they need to log into their 
Facebook account. 
Threats to Privacy in Facebook on a Desktop vs. a Public Tabletop Setting 
      In Figure 3.1, every point represents a situation in the 3D space (location, screen size, 
data accessibility). This section focuses on two points that are most closely related to this 
research. The first is when an application with public data accessibility (Facebook) is used on 
a medium screen size device such as desktop computer in a semi-public place such as at 
home (Df: semi-public, medium, public). The second point which is more important for this 
work is when an application with public data accessibility (Facebook) is used on a large 
screen size device such as a digital tabletop in a public place such as a shopping mall (Tf: 
public, large, public). 
In order to determine what the privacy requirements are that should be met in either 
of the situations, a few statements representing privacy risks are taken as examples from 
Facebook’s privacy policy. Then, some of the potential privacy threats existing in 
Facebook’s privacy policy statements are recognized in both regular and tabletop settings and 
are demonstrated using scenarios.  
      Moreover, in the left column of each table the related privacy principles from each of the 
privacy frameworks (OECD, PIPEDA, and FTC’s FIP) are identified because, as it is 
explained in Patrick and Kenny’s (2003) work and mentioned in Chapter 2, the four core 







“Facebook pages are public pages. Because pages are public, information you share with a page is public information. This means, for example, that if you 
post a comment on a page, that comment can be used by the page owner off of Facebook, and anyone can see it (Facebook, 2012).” 
















• User may not realize pages are 
public. 
 
• User may not know how public 
pages work such as information 
posted in a page might be used 
off of Facebook. 
 
• User may not be aware what 
information will be collected 
from him/her. 
 
• User does not know for what 
purposes his/her information 
Scenario: This scenario addresses the 
privacy risks of public pages with 
current Facebook version. 
 
Action: John Doe is at home and opens 
his laptop computer to surf on his 
Facebook. While on his home page, he 
notices one of his friends commented 
on a debatable political post on a 
famous magazine page. He replies to 
the post and goes off of Facebook.  
Next day, he checks the magazine 
website and notices his comment with 
his name and a link to his profile is 
• User may not pay 
attention to being in a 
public page, or 
commenting on a pubic 
page because his/her 
activities are visible to the 
public and they want to 
finish ASAP. 
 
• User may skip the user 
agreement because of 
public exposure of his/her 
information. 
 
Scenario: This scenario 
addresses the privacy risk of 
using public pages on a 
digital tabletop with current 
Facebook version. 
 
Action: John Doe is a great 
fan of a clothing company. 
While he is at its store in a 
shopping mall notices there is 
a digital tabletop in one corner 
of the store with the store’s 
fan page open on top. He goes 








will be used off of Facebook. 
 
• User does not know for how 
long his/her information will be 
retained. 
 
• User does not know who is 
accountable for the data 
collection. 
 
• There is no option available to 
inspect and challenge his/her 
PII discrepancy. 
 
• User does not know whether 
his/her PII will be deleted after 
opting out (unsubscribing, 
unliking) from the page. 
posted on the website’s discussion 
board section without his consent. 
John Doe who did not want his 
colleagues to know his political point 
of view is very upset about this 
situation and goes to the page and 
deletes his comment. But his comment 
still is on the website. He goes back to 
the page looking for an email or 
contact information but cannot find 
any. He sends a message to the page 
owner. Two weeks passes and he still 
did not get a response. 
All in all John Doe had an unpleasant 
experience and feels he has no control 
over his information privacy and his PI 
is being used despite the Facebook 
privacy policy being linked on that 
page which normally means they obey 
this privacy policy.    
• User may forget to log off 
and other people take 





comments on the page and 
suddenly notices someone 
posted some false information 
about the brand. He who is 
very loyal to the brand, 
immediately logs in with his 
account and agrees with some 
terms being shown to him and 
replies to that comment. Then 
leaves the table and goes out 
of store without logging off. 
After 10 minutes a kid comes 
to the table and starts leaving 
unpleasant messages for his 
friends and deleting some 
stuff. 
Next day, when John Doe 
found out what happened in 
his profile, he became very 
upset and promised himself to 








“Your friends and the other people you share information with often want to share your information with applications to make their experiences on those 
applications more personalized and social.  One of your friends might want to use a music application that allows them to see what their friends are listening 
to. To get the full benefit of that application, your friend would want to give the application her friend list that includes your User ID so the application 
knows which of her friends is also using it (Facebook, 2012).” 
 
Principle Privacy Threats Description Tabletop-Specific 
Privacy Threats Description 
Purpose 
Specification




• User may not want 
others to know 
he/she is using that 
application. 
 
• User may not want to 
know what type of 
music he/she listens 
to or pictures he look 
at. 
 
• User may not want 
his/her ID to be 
Scenario:  This scenario addresses the 
privacy risks of above situation. 
 
Action: John Doe uses a music 
application in Facebook and listens to his 
favorite music through that application. 
One day he receives a phone call from 
one of his friends asking how he is doing 
and added that he noticed some 
depressing music John has been listening 
to recently. John assured him there is 
nothing important and hung up the 
phone. 
• User may not want 




• User may not be aware 




Scenario: This scenario addresses the 
privacy risk of above situation on a digital 
tabletop with current Facebook version. 
 
Action: John Doe plays violin in a classic 
orchestra. He does not want his friends in 
the group to know that he also likes hard 
rock songs and listens to them often. One 
day when he was working on the digital 
tabletop and also listening to rock music in 
the background in the music institution, one 
of the students who in fact is not a very good 






shared with third 
party applications. 
 
   All in all John Doe was very upset with 
the situation and the fact that he does not 
have privacy even in listening to music 
and decided to unsubscribe from the 
application. 
  
notices he is using that app. 
   The day after the student registers for the 
app. Once he does that he can see all the 
music that John listens to and finds out John 
is a big fan of rock music. Then he spreads 
rumors around the institution that John is not 
really devoted to classical music and he 
probably should have been a rock musician. 
   All in all, John was upset about people 
being judgmental around him and then about 
the fact that using the digital tabletop in the 








“If you share your contact information (such as your email address or mobile number) with your friends, they may be able to use third party applications to 
sync that information with other address books, including ones on their mobile phones (Facebook, 2012).” 













• User may 
not know his/her 
information can be 
synced or exported 
with other 
applications. 
• User may 
not  want a third-
party to get access to 
his friends’ email 
addresses and 
possibly sell them to 
other companies for 
advertising purposes. 
 
Scenario:  This scenario addresses the 
privacy risks of above situation. 
 
Action: John Doe has a Facebook account 
with default privacy settings in place. He 
started receiving advertising emails from 
unknown companies recently. He also 
noticed all the companies he is receiving 
email from are those that one of his friends 
interacts with on Facebook. After 
discussing this with his friend, they figured 
out each time John’s friend subscribed to a 
company’s page on Facebook, he was 
actually giving consent that the emails of 
all his friends that are public can be 
collected and used by that company. 
• User may not notice that 
their information such as 
email address or mobile 
number is public by 
default. 
• User may not want their 
information to be used by 
third parties for any other 
purpose than they gave 
permission for. 
• User may not be aware 
that they are giving 
consent to third party 
applications to gather 
their friends’ 
information. 
Scenario: This scenario addresses the 
privacy risk of above situation on a digital 
tabletop with current Facebook version. 
 
Action: John Doe works in a retail store.  
One day while he was using the digital 
tabletops in their store and he was in the 
middle of using an application on his 
Facebook, a customer came in and he had to 
finish using the tabletop. He agreed to the 
message that just popped-up on the screen 
and closed his Facebook account. The day 
after while he was using the application 
again he noticed that the application is 
sending suggestion to all his friends in 







“We like to tell you about some of the features your friends use on Facebook to help you have a better experience. For example, if your friend uses our 
friend finder tool to find more friends on Facebook, we may tell you about it to encourage you to use it as well. This of course means your friend may 
similarly see suggestions based on the things you do. But we will try to only show it to friends that could benefit from your experience (Facebook, 2012) .” 













• User may not 
know that 
features he is 
using are being 
revealed and 
suggested to his 
friends. 
 
• User may not 
want his other 
friends to know 
that he is using a 
particular 
feature. 
Scenario:  This scenario addresses the 
privacy risks of above situation. 
 
Action: John Doe has been single 
recently and started thinking about 
online dating applications. He 
connected to one through his Facebook 
account. The day after, John’s friend 
called him and warned him about the 
freauds in online dating application. 
John was really surprised that his friend 
knew about this and decided to never 
again use tools and applications in 
Facebook.  
 
• User may not want the 
Facebook’s 
suggestions to be 
shown in public 
places. 
 
• User may not want 
Facebook to suggest 
their activities to 
friends in public 
places. 
Scenario: This scenario addresses the privacy risk 
of above situation on a digital tabletop with current 
Facebook version. 
 
Action: John Doe is busy surfing in his Facebook 
account at an airport until his flight time arrives. 
Another person is using the table with him as well. 
The second person notices some Facebook’s 
suggestion in John’s page regarding one of John’s 
friend’s recent activities. The stranger is attracted to 
John’s friend and remembers her name to add her to 
his friend list on Facebook later and pretend that he 








In this section I identified three factors of privacy (location, screen size, data accessibility) 
and identified two key threats associated with digital tabletops in public settings: shoulder 
surfing and information sharing. I then extended my threat assessment to the use of 
applications with public data accessibility (e.g., Facebook) through the use of scenarios 
addressing both desktop computers and digital tabletops to better distinguish the respective 










Chapter 4. Designing Interfaces to Support 
Privacy in Public Settings 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 3, I identified unique privacy threats present when using online social networks 
on digital tabletops in public settings. Location, data accessibility, and screen size were 
identified as three factors that affect people’s information privacy. Shoulder-surfing and 
information sharing were also discussed as two common privacy threats when using digital 
tabletops in public settings. 
      In this chapter, I introduce five user-interface design ideas to address these privacy 
threats. Specifically, I present alternative designs that could be used in an information-
sharing application such as Facebook on a digital table. The ideas presented contribute to an 
understanding of the context of privacy while using online social networks as an information-
sharing application on digital tabletops in public settings such as shopping malls. Each design 
idea is presented and then discussed based on the four categories of requirements for the 
effective design of privacy in an interface that were introduced in Section 2.4: 
comprehension, consciousness, control, and consent (Patrick & Kenny, 2003). Each design is 
structured so that the least amount of information is shown where possible; however, some 
expansion features are available to the user to access more information upon request. Also 
each design can be useful in addressing both categories of privacy threats on digital tabletops 
(shoulder-surfing and information sharing) (Section 3.4). I first briefly reiterate the four 








The principle of comprehension suggests that participants should know that by using a digital 
tabletop in a public setting their information is open to new type of collection, use and 
disclosure and there might be threats and possibly malicious use, specifically, threats that are 
caused by the open and collaborative nature of digital tabletops. 
 
Consciousness 
The principle of consciousness suggests that participants should be aware and conscious of 
threats to information privacy. In the specific situation of tabletop use in a public setting, this 
consciousness extends to an awareness of unique threats to personal information, such as the 
possibility of unfamiliar people being able to observe private information, like appointments 
and personal pictures, as well as passwords and credit card numbers.  
 
Control 
The principle of control suggests that participants should have control over how their 
personal information is being handled and be able to control it as needed. Specifically, when 
the user is working on a digital tabletop in a public setting and a stranger joins them at the 
same table and wishes to change the level of information visibility, both parties should be 
able to easily control what information gets shared from their own part of the screen. 
 
Consent (discussed only in interface-design ideas 2 and 3) 
The principle of consent suggests that the process of giving consent should be informed, 
unambiguous, and explicit. In the specific setting of a digital table in a public setting, the 
design should be particularly concerned with providing consent about what information is 








4.2 User-Interface Design Ideas for Effective Privacy Interfaces 
 
Design Idea 1: Blurring and Revealing Information 
In some situations, it may be desirable to display information contained in a message without 
revealing the entirety of the message. 
Scenario: Alice is in a public library and wants to check a book’s name in her Facebook 
messages on a digital tabletop, but does not want all the information to become visible so 
that Bob (a passer-by) would be able to read or shoulder surf. 
In this interface-design idea, I demonstrate the use of a blurring technique that blurs the 
entire message to prevent information from being unintentionally revealed. The user can 
unblur the text (i.e., make it visible) by dragging on the screen from left-to-right and can blur 
it again by dragging from right-to-left (Control). Therefore, if a user wants to show some 
information to another person, he/she has control over not revealing personal information, yet 
still has the opportunity to share. One possible drawback of this technique is that, if the 























Design Idea 2: Pattern Consent 
As discussed above, although each design was created using the principle of minimalism, the 
user still has the ability to view any level of detail of the information (Control). Moreover, many 
current designs use the concept of a message box to obtain consent. In this interface-design idea, 
I investigate the use of a dragging technique to address privacy threats when navigating through 
such a message box. 
Figure 4.3 shows the interface when the user is looking at their message inbox. The user 
might, for instance, decide to see all the messages at once, similar to how they would be 
currently presented in Facebook on a desktop. Selecting the “Classic Facebook Website” button 
changes the interface so that all messages are visible. The revealing of all messages is an event 
that, without proper design, could easily introduce privacy threats. 
One way to ensure that users pay attention to the message is to engage them in an activity. 
One example, as illustrated in Figure 4.3, is to require that the user make a hand gesture on the 
surface in order to proceed, an idea inspired by the “Pattern Lock” locking mechanism on 
Android devices. The idea is to ensure the user understands and is aware of his/her action and 
anticipated consequences (Comprehension and Consciousness). This message is implied with 
the red glowing border, warning message, and the action of making a gesture on the table to 






unlock the code. By giving the user a pattern to unlock the code, the user likely becomes more 
aware of his or her decision. Also, as is shown in Figure 4.4, the “Okay” button is not activated 
until the user makes the whole gesture on the screen and verifies that he or she has read the 
message. Using this technique, a user cannot easily skip the message without paying attention 













                                         




















































Design Idea 3: Swipe Consent 
Interface-design idea 3 is an alternative technique for avoiding threats to privacy when 
navigating through a message box (Control). This technique follows the idea of Just-In-Time-
Click-Through agreement (Patrick & Kenny, 2003) and tries to inform the user of his/her 
decision (Comprehension) and makes him/her aware of the possible consequences 
(Consciousness). Upon completing the necessary dragging actions, the user can be expected to 














The idea of requiring the user to slide the bar in order to read the text, inspired by the lock 
screen on Apple’s iPhone, is to obligate the user to read the warning message before being 
able to proceed to the next page (Consent). Therefore, the Okay button will not be activated 
even half way through (Figure 4.8) but only once the user slides the cursors and reveals the 
whole message (Figure 4.9). 





























Figure 4.8 The okay button is not activated until the whole message is activated 
























Design Idea 4: Semantic Zooming 
Semantic zoom is an information visualization technique for zooming into information in 
which not only the size of the data is affected but also the presentation level is different 
(Bederson & Hollan, 1994);(Perlin & Fox, 1993). The idea is that when a user is using a 
digital tabletop in a public place where people around who can shoulder surf, they can 
control the level of information as the people come and go. In this design, they can receive 
more or less information by pinching on the screen and resizing the page. When performing 
this action, the amount of presented information will be reduced or increased as the user 
zooms in or out (Control). There are arrows at the corner of the tabletop surface to signal to 
the user that semantic zooming is available (Comprehension and Consciousness).  
As can be seen in Figure 4.11, the smallest level of message archive is being shown. If 
the user pinches on the screen, the page becomes bigger and more information is revealed 
(Figure 4.12). Figure 4.13 shows the largest zoom level available, which has as much 
information as in a classic Facebook website. 


































Figure 4.12 When the page is zoomed in by pinching more level of information will be shown 

















Design Idea 5: Managing Multiple People Using Facebook 
Designing systems that make users aware of certain information at specific times has a long 
history (Wickens & Hollands, 2000). There are some interface techniques that use display 
characteristics to draw attention (Patrick & Kenny, 2003). In this interface-design idea, 
display characteristics are used to make users conscious about special features in the 
application that otherwise might be ignored. 
      Scenario: Bob is in a shopping mall and suddenly sees his friend Alice. He remembers 
that he was supposed to share some information with her that is in a message in his 
Facebook account. 
The redesigned Facebook interface in Figure 4.14 demonstrates an interface that not only 
provides the ability to share information with others but also provides control over personal 
information. As can be seen, the glowing border around the Facebook page plays a consistent 
role in reminding the user of being in a public setting and consequent potential privacy 
threats. Use of a glowing border for digital tabletop applications is discussed by Seto (2012) 
as a method to provoke interaction. This same idea is used here, but instead for  






providing awareness about the environment and associated privacy threats (Consciousness).   
            Additionally, as soon as the system knows about another person’s activity on the 
same tabletop, a red triangle appears in the same direction so that user constantly has in mind 
possible information theft from the other user. Alternatively, in systems that can sense the 
presence of another person around the digital table without them doing any activity, this red 
triangle could appear on approach rather than upon interaction. In addition, if the user taps on 
the red triangle a pop-up menu appears giving the user the option to either “Duplicate” the 
page for the user standing on that side so they can have a same view of the same page or 
“Pass to Left” which rotates the same page towards the other user (Control).  
Lastly, the “Log Off” button has a glowing red border in order to remind the user at all 
times not to forget about logging off from their account. The idea is to present this feature as 
a button whose color is exaggerated (e.g., with red or yellow) and put it in a place on the 
screen that has the greatest probability of being seen (Consciousness). The button also glows 
or can be shaded to maximize its effectiveness. The anticipated consequence of not doing so 




















4.3 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter I presented design techniques for creating user-interfaces with embedded 
privacy considerations suitable for the use of online social networks on digital tabletops in 
public settings. The focus of each set of design is on improving comprehension, 
consciousness, control, and consent elements. According to the privacy design framework 
introduced in Chapter 2, improving the above elements will lead to improvement of privacy 
requirements derived from privacy legislation (Patrick & Kenny, 2003). In the next chapter, I 
describe a study that was run to evaluate the interface-design ideas and techniques introduced 






Chapter 5. Evaluating New Interface Designs 
 
The interface-design ideas presented in Chapter 4 were an attempt to build a service/system 
that enables users to understand how their personally identifiable information is being 
handled, to control their personally identifiable information, to be informed when they are 
giving consent, and to give clear and explicit consent to the processing of their data (Patrick 
& Kenny, 2003). In this chapter, I evaluate users’ perceptions about the designs to validate 
the effectiveness of the techniques that have been proposed in the designs and assess whether 
they accomplish the goal of addressing the threats to privacy specific to digital tables in a 
public setting. 
      This chapter describes the results of an informal laboratory study in which the proposed 
interface-design ideas were evaluated to better understand the strengths and weaknesses of 
the designs presented in Chapter 4 and whether they meet our goals of improving personal 
information privacy according to framework elements introduced in Chapter 2.  
 
5.1 Method 
In this study, I evaluated the effectiveness of my designs at meeting the requirements 
categorized by comprehension, consciousness, control, and consent. As these properties are 
particularly difficult to measure quantitatively, I instead used a qualitative approach in which 
each participant completed some tasks with my proposed designs, and then provided 
feedback through questionnaires and an interview. 
 
Participants 
Ten graduate students from the University of Waterloo participated in the study. Four 
participants were female, six were male, and their ages ranged from 24 to 31 years (Mdn=27, 






them had experience using multi-touch smartphones. All participants had Facebook accounts 
and 80% were used to collaboratively using Facebook with friends in public settings. 
 
Apparatus 
The study was conducted on a SMART Table, which is a rear-projected tabletop display 
with a 71.5 cm (diagonal) interactive touch screen (Figure 5.1). The projected display was 91.5 
cm by 74 cm with a resolution of 1024 by 768 pixels, and the table itself is 65.4 cm tall. 
Participants sat beside the table on a chair adjusted to a fixed height so that they were within 
comfortable reaching distance to the entire surface of the display. The software for the study was 
developed in Processing (http://processing.org/), a Java-based programming language, and the 
Simple Multi-Touch plugin6 7 for Processing, which provides support for multi-touch devices 
and for the SMART table being used in this study. Coding was performed by an undergraduate 
intern at the University of Ontario, Institute of Technology. 
 
Procedure 
Each participant began the experimental session by filling out a pre-study questionnaire, 
which included ten background questions about their previous experiences with Facebook and 
their current understanding of privacy policies in general and for Facebook in particular. Then, 
the experimenter explained the study procedure and asked participants to imagine themselves in 
a public setting such as a busy and crowded shopping mall while performing the tasks in the 
experiment so that they had a sense of the targeted environment and the fact that unfamiliar 
people and strangers may pass by and they have to be careful with their information. With this 
scenario in mind, participants were asked to complete five tasks, each one followed by a 
questionnaire specific to that task. The entire session ended with a brief interview, the 




















Task 1: In task one, participants were asked to work with the tabletop and log into the 
application, and then to try to find John Smith’s phone number in their message inbox 
without revealing any other information. They also were told that there was a feature 
available in the application that would help them to achieve this goal. The purpose of this 
task was to evaluate the blurring technique and to determine whether the “blurring and 
revealing information” technique could improve any of the comprehension, consciousness, 
and control elements. 
Task 2 and 3: In task 2 and 3 the experimenter introduced two additional interface-
design ideas for providing consent: “pattern consent” and “swipe consent”. In this part of the 
study, participants were asked to use both techniques in order to evaluate their effectiveness 
at providing these improvements. In both tasks 2 (pattern consent) and 3 (swipe consent), 
participants were asked to find the name of the last person who sent them a message. In order 
to complete the task they were directed to a consent page including a warning message and 
an okay button. In task 2 (pattern consent), participants were shown a warning message that 
explained the action they were taking and described that they were to reproduce a pattern 






through a gesture generated by the system in a designated area (see Chapter 4, Section 4.2). 
In task 3, they were asked to slide bars from left to right to reveal the whole message and be 
able to read it (see Chapter 4, Section 4.2). In both tasks, the okay button was disabled and 
they could not proceed until the dragging action was completed. 
Task 4: The purpose of this task was to investigate whether or not semantic zooming is 
effective at providing control of one’s personal information while using digital tabletops in 
public settings. In this task, the participant was specifically asked to find the number of 
notifications in the message inbox. This process required them to navigate to a page that used 
Semantic Zooming (See Chapter 4, Section 4.2) as a technique to access different levels of 
information presentation. The main purpose, however, was to evaluate whether semantic 
zooming is an effective technique at giving users control over their personal information.  
Task 5: In the last task, the experimenter joined participants at the table and started 
working on a separate page on the same table as the participant was completing the task. 
While the participant’s page had a red border at all times, a red triangle appeared when the 
experimenter joined the table which acted as a drop-down menu with collaboration options 
(See Chapter 4, Section 4.2). The idea was to evaluate the effectiveness of these options in 
addressing users’ privacy requirements by improving comprehension, consciousness, and 
control.  
Data Collection 
Three types of data collection were used in this study: questionnaire, interview, and 
video recording. After each task, participants completed a questionnaire specific to that task 
(see Appendix III for a complete list of questions) including questions related to 
comprehension, consciousness, control, and consent (if applicable) to evaluate how effective 
each design was in improving these elements. For each task they also answered one question 
verbally in an interview form. Moreover, each session was video recorded so that the 
experimenter could go back and listen to interviews and review how they made gestures and 







The following hypotheses were tested in this study and each is related to one task: 
H1: 
 
The blurring technique improves a person’s ability to comprehend and be 
conscious of threats to privacy, and to control how much of their information is 
shared with others in a public setting. 
H2: The pattern consent technique improves a person’s ability to comprehend and be 
conscious of threats to privacy, to control how much of their information is 
shared with others, and to give informed and unambiguous consent to the 
processing of sensitive data in a public setting. 
H3: The swipe consent technique improves a person’s ability to comprehend and be 
conscious of threats to privacy, to control how much of their information is 
shared with others, and to give informed and unambiguous consent to the 
processing of sensitive data in a public setting. 
H4: The Semantic zooming technique improves a person’s ability to comprehend and 
be conscious of threats to privacy, and to control how much of their information 
is shared with others in a public setting. 
H5: The use of collaboration features to manage multiple people improves a person’s 
ability to comprehend and be conscious of threats to privacy, and to control how 
much of their information is shared with others in a public setting. 
 
5.3 Results 
The data sets were analyzed using SPSS software. Answers were analyzed using a 
combination of Chi-Square and One-Sample Wilcoxon Singed-Rank analyses for “Yes” and 
“No” and scale-based questions, respectively (α = .05). The null hypothesis for all Wilcoxon 
tests is that the median of each question is equal to the score of the “Neutral” responses. 
Therefore, in 5-point scale questions the null hypothesis is that the median is equal to 3 and 
in 7-point scale questions is equal to 4. In Chi-Square tests, the null hypotheses are that all 






results for each task’s questionnaire data, and then describe results of interview and 
observations for each task. Because this is an informal study with a limited number of 
participants (10), the statistical power of the experiment was low, and the a “Marginally 
 Significant” level was set to be between .05 and .09.  
5.3.1 Questionnaire Data 
For each task, all questions are divided into the categories of comprehension, consciousness, 
control, and consent and a quick summary of the results is presented. However open-ended 
and interview questions will be discussed later in Section 5.3.2. 
 
Task 1: Message Blurring 
Table 5.2 shows the results of the data related to task 1. Participant responses to ease of 
finding the technique (Q2) were not significantly weighted towards ease or difficulty. On the 
other hand, participants reported that the blurring technique helped make them conscious of 
privacy threats in public settings, though this result was only marginally significant (Q3). 
Participants also reported that the blurring technique was helpful (i.e., was rated significantly 
higher than neutral) in controlling information theft in public settings (Q4). 
Table 5.1 Task 1 questions 
Q2 Did you find the “Blur Messages” option easy to find? 
Q3 If you answered “Yes” to the above question, how much did this feature make you aware of 
privacy threats in a public place on a scale of 1 to 5? 
Q4 How much do you think the invisible touch is helpful to avoid information theft in public 
places on a scale of 1 to 7? 
 
Table 5.2 Task 1 test results  
*W= One-Sample Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test Statistic 
** The bolded p-value means the test is significant or marginally significant. 
Core Concept Question Type W χ2 p N Distribution Mdn Max Min 
Comprehension Q2 Yes/No/I didn’t use it - 1.4 .497 10 
Yes=5, No=3, I 
Didn’t use it=2 - - - 
Consciousness Q3 5-point scale 6 - .083 5 
Neutral=2, Made me 
aware=3 4 4 3 










Task 2: Pattern Consent 
 
Table 5.4 shows the test results for task 2. The message in the consent page was helpful 
(i.e., rated significantly higher than neutral) for comprehending the possible privacy threat of 
switching to the classic Facebook page in public settings (Q7). Moreover, participants 
reported that the pattern consent feature made them significantly more conscious (Q8) and 
provided significantly more control (Q10) for avoiding information theft in public places. 
 




Table 5.4 Task 2 test results 
*W= One-Sample Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test Statistic 
** The bolded p-value means the test is significant or marginally significant. 
Q7 How much do you think the warning message was informative and helpful in understanding the situation 
on a scale of 1 to 7? 
Q8 How much did this feature make you aware and conscious of being in a public place and anticipated 
consequences of your decision on a scale of 1 to 5? 
Q10 How much do you think the Passgesture is helpful to avoid information theft in public places on a scale 
of 1 to 7 
Q12 The type of user agreement being presented in Task 2 is a short targeted type of user agreement called 
Just-in-time-click-through-agreement. How effective did you find this comparing to long user 
agreements on a scale of 1 to 7 
Core Concept Question Type W χ2 p N Distribution Mdn Max Min 
Comprehension Q7 7-p scale 36 - .01 10 
Neutral=2,Somewhat 
 helpful=4, Helpful=4, 
Very helpful=1 
5.5 7 4 
Consciousness Q8 5-p scale 25 - .05 10 
Little effect=1, 
Neutral=3, Good 
effect=4, Made me really 
aware=2 
4 5 2 






6 7 2 











Task 3: Swipe Consent 
In task 3, all questions had significant test results (see Table 5.6). Nine of ten 
participants reported that they felt they could comprehend what to do (Q14), and participants 
reported that the message in the consent page was helpful (i.e., rated significantly higher than 
neutral) for comprehension of the consequences of their actions (Q15). Participants also 
reported that the swipe consent technique was effective in making people conscious of 
privacy threats at a digital tabletop in a public setting (Q16). Also, participants indicated that 
the swipe consent technique was helpful in controlling information theft (Q18) and effective 
at allowing participants to give a clear, unambiguous consent (Q20).  
Table 5.5 Task 3 questions 
 
 
Table 5.6 Task 3 test results 
*W= One-Sample Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test Statistic 
** The bolded p-value means the test is significant or marginally significant.
Q14 Was the little “Slide to right” note on the message bar helpful in understanding what to do? 
Q15 How much do you think the warning message was helpful and informative about your decision and 
anticipated consequences on a scale of 1 to 7? 
Q16 How effective was this feature in making you aware and conscious of being in a public place and the 
possible consequences of your decision on a scale of 1 to 5? 
Q18 How helpful do you think the slide-to-reveal technique is to avoid information theft in public places on 
a scale of 1 to 7? 
Q20 On a scale of 1 to 7, how effective was the slide-to-reveal technique to make you read the warning 
message as opposed to lengthy user agreements we normally see? 
Core Concept Question Type W χ2 p N Distribution Mdn Max Min 
Comprehension 
Q14 Yes/No/ Not Sure - 6.4 .01 10 Yes=9, Not sure=1 - - - 




6.5 7 4 




6.5 7 5 




5 7 4 







Task 4: Semantic Zoom 
All task 4 questions were not significantly different than the neutral rating and so there is 
no clear indication that semantic zooming was effective for providing comprehension, 
consciousness, or control of privacy threats on a digital table in a public setting. On the other 
hand, there is also no evidence that this technique hindered privacy concerns in this context. 
 
Table 5.7 Task 4 questions 
 
Table 5.8 Task 4 test results 
*W= One-Sample Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test Statistic 
** The bolded p-value means the test is significant or marginally significant. 
 
Task 5: Managing Multiple People Using Facebook 
Table 5.9 shows the results of analysis for task 5. The red triangle was not shown to be 
an effective indicator of the presence of another person at the table, with the number of 
people noticing vs. not noticing being statistically insignificant (Q28), leaving a small 
Q21 How helpful were the arrows at the corner of the page in communicating that you can resize the page 
by pinching on a scale of 1 to 7? 
Q23 How effective was this feature in making you aware and conscious of being in a public place and the 
possible consequences of your decision on a scale of 1 to 7? 
Q24 How helpful do you think the Semantic Zoom for users to control their personal information in 
public places on a scale of 1 to 7? 
Core Concept Question Type W χ2 p N Distribution Mdn Max Min 
Comprehension Q21 7-p scale 10.5 - .27 10 




3.5 6 1 






4 6 2 
Control Q24 7-p scale 26.5 - .22 10 













number of responses for its effectiveness (Q29) at providing consciousness of the privacy 
threat of others being aware of one’s actions. However, all participants reported that they 
noticed the “log off” button, rendering the statistical test for Q30 to be not technically 
possible to run due to lack of variation. Therefore, the deterministic result is that everyone 
noticed the log off button at the corner of the page. Furthermore, participants reported that 
the placement of the log off button was effective at making them conscious of the need to log 
off before leaving the digital table. Participants also reported that the the pop-up menu 
provided through the red triangle was effective at providing control over the sharing of 
personal information (Q32).   
Table 5.9 Task 5 questions 
 
Table 5.10 Task 5 test results 
*W= One-Sample Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test Statistic 
** The bolded p-value means the test is significant or marginally significant. 
Q28 Did you notice the red triangle appeared when I started using the table? 
Q29 If you answered “Yes” to the above question, how effective do you think this technique is in making users 
more conscious when another person starts using the same table in a public setting on a scale of 1 to 7? 
Q30 Did you notice the “Log off” button at the top right corner of the page? 
Q31 If you answered “Yes” to the above question, how effective do you think the design and placement of the 
“Log off” button was in making the user more aware about logging off their Facebook account on the 
digital tabletop in a public setting on a scale of 1 to 7? 
Q32 On a scale of 1 to7, how effective do you think the pop-up menu was in giving you control over how to 
share your personal information? 
Core Concept Question Type W χ2 p N Distribution Mdn Max Min 
Consciousness 
Q28 Yes/No/ Not Sure - .8 .67 10 
No=4, Yes=4, Not 
Sure=2 - - - 




6.5 7 5 
Q30 Yes/No/ Not Sure - - - 10 Yes=10 - - - 





6 7 4 












5.3.2 Observations, Open- Ended Questions and Interview Data  
 
In this section, I report the results of the open-ended questions and semi-structured interviews 
conducted in between questions. A total of 5 interview questions and 8 open-ended questions 
were asked of participants each related to one a specific task. The interview questions were 
focused on the control element of each task and were intended to elaborate on the 
controllability of personal information. 
 
Task 1: Message Blurring 
Three participants (30%) reported that they did not quite understand what the technique 
was supposed to do (Q1). Two participants (20%) also did not understand the idea behind the 
blurring technique and thought it was annoying. The rest (50%) suggested that the technique 
could be used to protect information, especially when working in public.  Overall, 
participants seemed to have a good understanding of the notion of this technique.   
During interviews, although most of the participants found this technique beneficial for 
protecting their personal information in public places (Q5), many of them had difficulties 
finding the information they were asked to find and felt that because it was the first time they 
were using this technique they had difficulty locating the information. Even in instances 
where participants opened the message without blurring it, many tried to hide the information 
with their hands to protect their information. Many of them said that if they had a mechanism 
to search for specific text, it would be very helpful for them to control their information and 
possibly avoid using this feature 
 
Task 2: Pattern Consent 
Responses to open-ended questions (Q6) revealed that one participant was unable to 
complete task 2 and did not go through the page that included the pattern consent technique, 
another participant did not comprehend the notion of the technique (Q6) and thought it was 







engaging in the act of gesturing to focus his attention on reading the warning message before 
giving consent. The six remaining participants recognized the feature as being like a 
password or passkey that needed to be unlocked to proceed. Finally, one participant said the 
feature was present to avoid accidentally pushing the button to switch to the classic Facebook 
page. 
An important concept for providing control is to make sure the feature is designed to be 
natural and easy to control (affordance) (Patrick & Kenny, 2003), so the affordance of the 
pattern consent technique was examined in Q9. One of the ten participants did not 
accomplish task 2, and therefore did not use the pattern consent technique. Six participants 
realized that they had to read the message and draw the pattern while three others did not 
really understand what to do at first, and had to navigate back and forth through the pages 
until they did.  
In response to how this technique can be improved to give users more control over their 
personal information (Q11) most participants said they did not read the message and focused 
entirely on making the gesture, so if there could be a way to make them pay more attention to 
the message it would be more efficient. Perhaps because the gesture was similar to Android’s 
unlocking technique, they were familiar with what to do and did not pay attention to the 
warning. 
 
Task 3: Swipe Consent 
      In task 3, in response to what participants think the swipe consent technique does (Q13), 
one participant said he thought the feature was intended to warn him about his actions, due to 
being in a public setting. Interestingly, two participants said this technique made them think 
more than the technique in task 2 about moving on to the next step and whether it was safe or 
not to do so. In other words, it was more effective at drawing their attention to the need to 
understand what was going on. Two participants said they thought they should unlock the 
page while it tried to warn them about something. One said it was a technique to force them 







it was to walk the user through a warning message. Also, one participant did not answer and 
just said they did not like it. 
      Five participants reported that they understood what they had to do when they saw the 
consent page (Q17) and that they were supposed to slide it to the right to reveal something. 
One participant stated that, since it was the first time he was seeing the swipe consent 
technique he wanted to make sure that he was in the right place before advancing to the next 
screen. Another participant said he thought this was a way to make sure no one was around, 
so that he could read the message in private. Also, one participant said that at first he thought 
it was a sort of security measurement, while another said she thought this was a private 
message and should not be read it in public. 
In response to how the swipe consent technique can be improved to give users more 
control over their personal information (Q19), participants reported interest in sliding the 
bars to see what would happen. Because of their engagement in this task most of them read 
the whole warning message, unlike in task 2. However, a few of them stated that if they 
become used to this technique, they will probably slide the bars quickly and press the okay 
button without reading the text. Similarly, some of them reported that lengthy messages 
should be avoided because it makes the user tired. Lastly, one participant slid the bars from 
the bottom to the top and at the end suggested an order for the lines. 
 
Task 4: Semantic Zoom 
       Among all participants, only one realized that the technique was useful for avoiding 
shoulder surfing and other privacy threats (Q22). Four of the participants stated that this 
technique was intended to ease zooming or was simply a different technique for zooming in 
and out. Two participants had no idea what the semantic zooming was for in the study. One 
participant thought that this was just a technique that demonstrated the multi-touch 
capabilities of the table. One participant stated the feature was to enable viewing of 







      Responses to how the semantic zooming technique can be improved to give users more 
control over their personal information (Q25) showed that most participants were unfamiliar 
with the semantic zooming and had difficulty determining what to do. They hardly noticed 
the arrows at the corner of the surface; when asked how the technique and users’ 
controllability can be improved they made suggestions such as making the arrows bigger, or 
replacing them with a hand icon doing pinching. Also it was recognized that if there were a 
message or notification letting the user know that pinching is available would be very 
beneficial, especially for the first-time users and would avoid revealing information by 
zooming in accidentally in a public setting. 
 
Task 5: Multiple Simultaneous Uses 
One participant (10%) realized that the red triangle was a sign of an activity happening 
elsewhere at the table (Q26). Most participants (70%) did not understand when and why the 
red triangle appeared, and instead thought it was something that provided more options. Two 
participants did not notice the red triangle at all. 
Four of the participants wrote comments to the effect that they felt the red border was 
intended to show the border of the page and to separate the working areas (Q27). The 
remaining participants (6) did not notice the red border at all.  
Most of the participants said that they did not notice when exactly the red triangle 
appeared (Q33)and once they discovered it, they were not sure about trying the options, as 
they were concerned that by mistakenly pressing one of the options, they would accidentally 
share their screen with a stranger.  
 
5.4 General Discussion  
In this section, I summarize the findings of my study by first relating the results back to each 
task’s hypothesis, and then discuss implications for the design of digital tables in a public 
setting. The message blurring technique (used in task 1) was shown to improve 







information was shared (H1 confirmed). Observations and interview responses, however, 
indicated that the comprehension element could be improved by using methods that notify 
users of the availability of such a technique. 
      The pattern consent technique (used in task 2) was effective at improving a person’s 
ability to comprehend and be conscious of threats to privacy, to control how much of their 
information is shared with others, and to give informed and unambiguous consent to the 
processing of sensitive data in a public setting (H2 confirmed). However, the interviews and 
observations showed that some people might skip reading messages as they become more 
familiar with the technique. 
Perhaps the most promising technique was the swipe consent technique (used in task 3). 
It is clear from the analyses that H3 can be confirmed. All responses were significant and 
indicated that the technique provided comprehension, consciousness, control, and consent. 
Results also showed that most participants understood what the technique does and is for. 
Moreover, the interview data showed that the technique used in task 3 was new to 
participants and engaged them in doing the task and consequently led them to read the whole 
warning message, whereas in task 2 a few of them skipped reading the warning message, and 
many indicated they would be more likely to do so with repeated use. 
Contrary to H4, there was no clear evidence that semantic zooming (used in task 4) was 
useful for improving comprehension, consciousness, control, or consent in public settings at 
a digital table (i.e., H4 was not confirmed). Open-ended questions also revealed that only one 
person realized what the technique was supposed to do, and interview results showed that the 
main weakness of the technique was its lack of support for comprehension. Participants had 
difficulty noticing that this option was available and, when they did notice it, some of them 
were afraid of resizing the page and making private information more readable for people 
walking around or possibly shoulder surfing.  
      For the design that incorporated support for multiple simultaneous use of the table, 







partially supported (H5 was not confirmed). Most participants reported that they did not 
understand what either the red border or the red triangle was intended to indicate 
(comprehension). However, there was unanimous agreement on the noticeability of the log 
off button, and participants reported that this improved consciousness of this specific privacy 
threat. However, participants did report that the menu available when a second person was 
present provided suitable control of one’s personal information. Nonetheless, the interview 
data and observations showed that the red border and triangle techniques used in task 5 had 
the potential to put users in an adverse condition of mistakenly sharing their page with 
strangers instead of helping them to control their information consciously. Participant did not 
realize when and why the red triangle appeared and some of them had difficulties finding 
options available for collaboration. 
5.5 Limitations 
The claims in this section are based on the findings of an informal study limited to the lab 
environment in the University of Waterloo with a small sample of participants with ages 
ranging from 24 to 31. Running a formal study with a larger number of participants from 
different age groups would complement the results of this study. Moreover, if this follow-up 
study were run in an actual public setting like a public library or a shopping mall, the data 
could be generalized further, as the participants would experience a more realistic feeling of 
being in a public place with unfamiliar people walking by as they explore the application. 
In this study, I did not use the classic Facebook page as a baseline application. Instead, a 
newly designed Facebook prototype was used to test a set of different designs. Moreover, 
although we tested comprehension, consciousness, and control in all interface designs, 
consent was only tested in two of them. Having said that, the interface designs were not 
compared to one another and instead the data was analyzed on a self-report scale. In future 
research, the best result will be achieved if participants first use the classic Facebook website 
as a baseline and then use the redesigned version. Also it will be ideal to compare data from 








In this chapter, I presented a laboratory study to validate the designs presented in Chapter 4. 
Specifically, my study has shown that message blurring and the swipe consent technique are 
good candidates for addressing privacy concerns in this emerging environment. In addition, I 
have shown that the semantic zooming and multiple-person interface may require further 
design iterations before they could be effective at addressing issues of privacy on digital 








Chapter 6. Conclusion and Future Work  
 
This thesis demonstrates the design, implementation, and evaluation of privacy-enhanced 
interface designs for online social networks on digital tabletops in public settings. The 
motivation for this thesis was to shed light on circumstances and consequences of using 
online social networks on digital tabletops in public settings and also to embed information-
privacy considerations into the design of systems and applications. The results of this 
research may provide knowledge and help for other researchers and system designers who 
work on digital tabletops in public settings. 
      This chapter concludes the thesis by summarizing the analyses and findings of the study. 
First the research contributions and final conclusions are discussed in Section 6.1 and then 
future work that this thesis may lead to and its implications are presented in Section 6.2. 
 
6.1 Conclusion 
Protection of personal information has become a critical issue in the digital world. The era of 
single-user desktop computers is changing to more sophisticated technologies such as digital 
tabletops. Digital tables are a promising new medium for the support of collaborative work. 
Instead of individuals working independently on their own devices or workstations, people 
can collaborate across a shared display through touch and gesture-based interaction while 
maintaining eye contact and engaging in conversation. Although digital tabletop displays 
offer many new possibilities for attracting the attention of passers-by in a public setting and 
offer the promise of new styles of interaction, they also introduce many potential threats to 
privacy. 
In Chapter 3, three factors that affect privacy were discussed and two common threats to 
digital tabletops in public settings were identified to set the scene for analysing online social 







online social network. Ultimately several potential privacy threats were identified despite 
Facebook’s privacy policy, judging from the privacy design framework introduced in 
Chapter 2. In Chapter 4, several interface designs were introduced to address the threats 
identified in Chapter 3. The motivation behind the designs is to improve personal information 
privacy according to the common requirements of widely-used privacy frameworks. 
In Chapter 5, a study was run to evaluate the effectiveness of the designs and to 
investigate users’ perception about their strengths and weaknesses.  The main result of the 
study shows that users are sensitive to comprehension design elements. Therefore, among the 
five designs evaluated, the semantic zooming and collaboration feature used to manage 
multiple people uses were the least successful because participants could not figure out what 
is happening and what they should do to reach their goal and control the situation. On the 
other hand, the blurring technique, pattern consent, and swipe consent techniques were able 
to successfully communicate the potential privacy threats, and were seen as helpful by our 
participants. 
The analyses of the interview data and findings based on observations also show that, in 
some cases, the level of control was not sufficient for participants and they started using their 
hands, for example, to protect their data. Such lack of control may result in people not using 
digital tabletops in public settings for information-sharing purposes. 
Despite some of the limitations of the techniques that were introduced to participants, 
participants recognized the value of these designs and this work demonstrates the viability of 
addressing the privacy threats identified in earlier chapters through the design of a social 
networking interface. With further refinement and iteration, it is likely that these techniques 
could be improved and incorporated into designs of future social networking applications on 








6.2 Future Work 
The result from this thesis can be used to inform the design of information-sharing websites 
(such as OSNs) for digital tabletops in public places. However, this research can also be used 
as a guide for a larger research project. The claims in this thesis are based on the findings of 
an informal study limited to the lab environment in the University of Waterloo with a small 
sample of participants with ages ranging from 24 to 31. 
Running a formal study in a public place with a larger number of participants of more 
varied ages would be complementary to this study. Moreover, this thesis uses Facebook as a 
sample online social network (OSN) Future research can investigate other OSNs such as 










OSN: Online Social Networks are websites such as Facebook, Twitter, etc., in which people 
share their information and interests and interact with friends in their profiles. 
Digital Tabletop: Digital tabletops are horizontal computer displays with an interactive 
touch-sensitive area which serves as the surface of the table. 
Privacy Policy: Privacy policy or sometimes called privacy law is a statement or legal 
document that defines the way a party collects, uses and disclosures personal information of 
users or clients. 
PIPEDA: The Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act is part of the 
federal privacy law that refers to the collection, use and disclosure of personal information in 
private sector organizations. 
Privacy Act: is part of the federal privacy law which regulates public sector institutions. 
HCI: Human-Computer Interaction is a field of study, mainly in Computer Science, that 
encompasses study, planning and design of interaction between people and computer. 
CSCW: The term computer-supported cooperative work is used when collaborative works 
and activities are being supported by computer systems. 
Microsoft Surface: Microsoft Surface is a computing platform made by Microsoft 
Corporation that enables user to interact with touch and other objects. 
OSN: Online social networks are online web-based services that enable people to share 
interest and/or activities. 
PII: Personally Identifiable Information is information which can be used to differentiate or 
locate and individual’s identity either alone or when joint with other information that is 







FTC: The Federal Trade Commission is an independent agency of the United States 
government concerned with the promotion of consumer protection and the elimination and 
prevention of anti-competitive business practices (Federal Trade Commission, 2012). 
FIP: Fair Information Practices are guidelines representative of generally-accepted practices 
in an electronic marketplace. 
OECD: The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development are focused on 
helping governments in member countries and elsewhere to promote policies that will 
improve the economic and social well-being of people around the world (Development, 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2012). 
PET: Privacy-Enhancing Technologies is a system of ICT measures protecting informational 
privacy by eliminating or minimising personal data thereby preventing unnecessary or 
unwanted processing of personal data, without the loss of the functionality of the information 
system (Blarkom, Borking, & Olk, 2003). 
UBICOMP: Ubiquitous Computing refers to the third era of technology advised by Mark 
Weiser which is a model of human-computer interaction that computing technologies 
integrate with everyday objects and activities. 
CAVE: A virtual reality environment in which projectors are directed to different walls of a 
room. The user walks around the room wearing a 3D glass to see 3D objects floating. 
Virtual Reality: Is a form of technology that applies to a computer-simulated environment. 
People can interact with objects and explore different things that are generated by computer.  
UI: User interface is the hardware and software components that exist between users and 
machine let the users manipulate the system. 
JITCTA: A type of short and targeted user agreement that is being shown at the exact 
moment that user’s consent is needed. If the user agrees with the term and gives consent, then 
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Appendix I. Privacy Frameworks 
 
OECD Privacy Framework8 
Collection Limitation Principle  
There should be limits to the collection of personal information with lawful and fair means 
and where possible with the consent of the data subject.  
 
Data Quality Principle 
Personal data that is being collected should be related to the specified purposes and to the 
extent sufficient for those purposes. It should be kept complete, accurate and up-to-date. 
 
Purpose Specification Principle 
The purpose of data collection should be specified before or at the time of data collection and 
the data usage should be limited to fulfilment of those specified purposes. If the purpose 
changed or expanded, first it should not be incompatible with the initial purposes and also it 
should be specifically mentioned what the changes are. 
 
Use Limitation Principle 
Collected personal data should not be disclosed to other parties or be used for purposes other 
than those specified except with the consent of the data subject or law authority. 
 
Security Safeguards Principles 
Reasonable security safeguards should be provided to protect personal data against 
destruction, unauthorized access or modification, loss etc.   
                                                 








Openness Principle  
There should be a general privacy policy available to the user about practices, policies with 
respect to personal information as well as the data controller’s identity and usual residence. 
 
Individual Participation Principle  
An individual should have the right to challenge his or her personal information’s existence 
and accuracy with no or minimal cost. If the challenge is successful his or her data should be 
erased, completed, or adjusted. If it is not successful and was denied there should be 
reasonable justifications and the user should have the right to challenge the denial as well. 
 
Accountability Principle  
A data controller should make necessary efforts to make sure the above principles are in 
effect. 
 
PIPEDA Privacy Framework9 
Accountability 
An organization is responsible for the personal data in its possession including information 
transferred to a third party and shall protect this information with effective measures. There 
should be designated individual(s) accountable for the compliance of the organization with 
the following principles. Responding to complaints and inquiries are the organization’s 
responsibility as well. 
 
Identifying Purpose  
                                                 







The purpose of the data collection shall be identified before or at the time of data collection 
and should be recorded for openness (Principle 8) and individual access (principle 9) 
policies. If a new purpose for the data is recognized, it should be identified before use and a 




For any collection, use and disclosure of personal data the knowledge and consent of the data 
subject is required unless there is law enforcement as in fraud protection programs. It should 
be in an understandable manner for the user and also clear about the purpose of data 
collection. Consent can have different forms depending on the type of information. An 
individual may withdraw consent at any time.  
 
Limiting Collection 
The collection of personal data shall be limited to the extent that is required for the identified 
purposes by fair and lawful means meaning that the user must not be misled and data 
collection should not be obtained through deception. The type of information being collected 
should be identified in privacy policy and practice that is available to the user to comply with 
openness (principle 8). 
 
Limiting Use, Disclosure and Retention 
Personal data shall not be used for purposes other than previously identified purposes or be 
disclosed to another party without the consent of the user as required by law. Personal data 
shall not be retained longer than the time required for fulfilling the purpose and there should 









Personal Information should be as accurate, complete, and up-to-date as it is necessary to 
make appropriate decisions. 
 
Safeguards 
Depending on the sensitivity of the personal information, sufficient security safeguards 
should be provided against modification, unauthorized access, disclosure, etc. It might be in a 
form of physical methods such as restricting access to the office or organizational measures 
like security clearance or technological methods such as encryptions or passwords. 
Also appropriate methods of protection should take place at the time of disposal or 
destruction of personal information. 
 
Openness 
An organization shall make its policies and practices regarding the management of personal 
information available to the users including type of information being kept and the means to 
access that information. This availability can be in different ways depending on some 
considerations such as having online access to it to be mailed to the requester. 
 
Individual Access 
Upon request, an individual should be informed about whether or not the organization holds, 
uses or disclosed any information about him or her and he or she should be able to challenge 
the accuracy and incompleteness of those data. If possible, any amendments made to the 
data, should be transferred to third parties having access to information in question. 
 
Challenging Compliance 
An individual should have the right to object to the compliance of the organization with the 








FTC Privacy Framework 
Notice/Awareness 
Notice means the entity’s information practices should be made available to the user before 
collecting the information from them. The central principle of the FTC’s FIP is 
Notice/Awareness because other principles are not meaningful if the user does not 
understand the policy and his or her rights. The types of information that the user must be 
given as part of the Notice/Awareness principle are as follows (Federal Trade Commission, 
Fair information Practice Principles): 
• “Identification of the entity collecting the data;  
• Identification of the uses to which the data will be put;   
• Identification of any potential recipients of the data;  
• The nature of the data collected and the means by which it is collected if not obvious 
(passively, by means of electronic monitoring, or actively, by asking the consumer 
to provide the information);  
• Whether the provision of the requested data is voluntary or required, and the 
consequences of a refusal to provide the requested information; and 
• The steps taken by the data collector to ensure the confidentiality, integrity and 
quality of the data. (Belloti, 1997)”  
The entity’s privacy policy should be easily available to the user (e.g. in a prominent location 
in the website) and should be understandable and clear. 
 
Choice/Consent 
Choice, as the second most important principle in this privacy framework, means giving the 
user options about how they want their personal information to be used especially in 
secondary uses other than those necessary for giving a complete service. For instance, giving 







      Traditionally there are two types of Choice/Consent methods: opt-in and opt-out. In opt-
in the user gives his/her specific agreement about his/her information to be used for 
secondary purposes. Whereas, in opt-out the user takes affirmative steps to prevent the 
collection and use of his/her information. These options can be in the form of a general 




Access means a user’s ability to review all the information collected about him/her as well as 
the ability to challenge incompleteness and inaccuracy of the information. Access should be 




Collectors must make sure that data are accurate and secure. As regards accuracy, they have 
to use reliable and cross-referencing sources against multiple sources and provide users 
access to data to verify their information. Regarding security, collectors should take 
managerial and technical measures to protect the data. They should limit the internal access 
to data and make sure no one can use the information for unauthorized purposes. They also 




In order to make sure companies follow the FIP Principles, there should be enforcement 
measures. Without a firm enforcement mechanism, a privacy protection principle is merely 
suggestive rather that prescriptive. Among all enforcement approaches there are three redress 







private remedies for users; and government enforcements through civil and criminal 
sanctions. 
a) Self-Regulation 
Companies should have mechanisms to ensure compliance with the fair information practices 
such as external audits to ensure compliance, and membership in an industry association. 
Companies must assure there are means for users and consumers to complain and address 
their concerns. Also if any of the self-regulatory codes have been breached, there should be a 
solution for that such as a means for a user to correct the data or to be compensated for being 
harmed. 
b) Private Remedies 
The enactment of private remedies that provide private rights of action for users and 
consumers in case they are harmed by misuse of their personal information can be a strong 
motivation for data collectors to adopt fair information practices. 
 
c) Government Enforcement 
The third mechanism is government enforcement of fair information practices by means of 
civil or criminal penalties. To a certain extent this is the present state of enforcement in the 
US under US federal law.  The US FTC imposes civil penalties including fine and 
imprisonment upon website operators who depart from their voluntarily adopted privacy 








Appendix II. Facebook Statement Analysis 
 
OECD & PIPEDA & FTC’s FIP 
 





Notice and Awareness 
1.1 If you tag someone, that person and their friends can see your post no 
matter what audience you selected. The same is true when you approve 
a tag someone else adds to your post.  
1.2 When you comment on or “like” someone else’s post, or write on their 
wall, that person gets to select the audience. 
1.3 Some types of posts are always public posts. As a general rule, you 
should assure that if you do not see a sharing icon, the information will 
be publicly available. 
1.4 Some types of posts are always public posts. As a general rule, you 
should assure that if you do not see a sharing icon, the information will 
be publicly available. 
1.5 Choose the public icon if you want to make something public. Choosing 
to make something public is exactly what it sounds like.it means that 
anyone, including people off of Facebook, will be able to see or access 
it. 
1.6 If you select “Only Me” as the audience for your friend list, but your 
friend sets her friend list to “Public”, anyone will be able to see your 
connection on your friend’s profile. 
1.7 If you choose to hide your gender, it only hides it on your profile. 
1.8 To make it easier for your friends to find you, we allow anyone with 
contact information (such as your email address and mobile number), to 
find you through Facebook search, as well as other tools we provide, 
                                                 







such as contact importers. 
1.9 If you share your contact information (such as your email address or 
mobile number) with your friends, they may be able to use third party 
applications to sync that information with other address books, 
including ones on their mobile phones. 
1.10 Some things (like your name and profile picture) do not have sharing 
icons because they are always publicly available. As a general rule you 
should assume that if you do not see sharing icon, the information will 
be publicly available. 
1.11 If you do not want someone to tag you and they refused not to do so, you 
can block them. This will prevent them from tagging you going 
forward.  
1.12 If you are tagged in a private space (such as a message or a group) only 
the people who can see the private space can see the tag. Similarly, if 
you are tagged in a comment, only the people who can see the comment 
can see the tag. 
1.13 Because pages are public, information you share with a page is public 
information. This means, for example, that if you post a comment on a 
page, that comment can be used by the page owner off of Facebook, and 
anyone can see it. 
1.14 When you “like” a page, you create a connection to that page. That 
connection is added to your profile and your friends may see it in their 
News Feeds. 
1.15 Some pages contain content that comes directly from the page owner. 
Because this content comes directly from the page owner, that page may 
be able to collect information about you, just like any website. 
1.16 We may receive information about you from the games, applications, 
and websites you use, but only when you have given the permission. 
1.17 Facebook games, applications and websites are created and maintained 
by other business and developers who are not part of Facebook, so you 
should always make sure to read their term of service and privacy 
policies. 







information and those you choose to make public, it will have to ask 
you for specific permission. 
1.19 Applications get your age range, locale, and gender when you and your 
friends visit them. 
1.20 Sometimes a game console, mobile phone, or other device might ask for 
permission to share specific information with the games and 
applications you use on that device (such as your public information). If 
you say okay, those applications will not be able to access any other 
information about you without asking specific permission from you or 
your friends. 
1.21 Your friends and the other people you share information with often want 
to share your information with applications to make their experiences 
on those applications more personalized and social. 
1.22 When you log in to a website using your Facebook, we give the site your 
User ID, but we do not share your email address or password with that 
website. 
1.23 If you make something public using a plugin, such a posting a public 
comment on a newspaper’s website, then that website can access your 
comment (along with your User ID) just like everyone else. 
1.24 Websites that use social plugins can sometimes tell that you have 
engaged with the social plugin. For example, they may know that you 
clicked on a Like button in a social plugin. 
1.25 We receive data when you visit a site with a social plugin. We keep this 
data for 90 days. After that, we remove your name or any other 
personally identifying information from the data, or combine it with 
other people’s data in a way that it is no longer associated with you. 
1.26 When you visit a site using instant personalization, it will know some 
information about you and your friends the moment you arrive. This is 
because instant personalization sites can access your User ID, your 
friends list, and your public information. 
1.27 The first time you visit an instant personalization site, you will see a 
notification letting you know that the site has partnered with Facebook 







1.28 Instant personalization when you first visit the site. It also prevents from 
accessing any information about you until you or your friends visit the 
site. 
1.29 If you turn public search setting off and then search for yourself on a 
public search engine, you may still see a preview of your profile. This is 
because some search engine cache information for a period of time. 
1.30 When an advertiser creates an ad on Facebook, they are given the 
opportunity to choose their audience by location, demographics, likes, 
keywords, and any other information we receive or can tell about you 
and other users. 
1.31 Many of the things you do on Facebook (like "liking" a Page) are posted 
to your Wall and shared in News Feed. But there's a lot to read in News 
Feed. That's why we allow people to "sponsor" your stories to make 
sure your friends see them. For example, if you RSVP to an event 
hosted by a local restaurant, that restaurant may want to make sure your 
friends see it so they can come too. If they do sponsor a story, that story 
will appear in the same place ads usually do under the heading 
"Sponsored Stories" or something similar. Only people that could 
originally see the story can see the sponsored story, and no personal 
information about you (or your friends) is shared with the sponsor. 
1.32 We like to tell you about some of the features your friends use on 
Facebook to help you have a better experience. For example, if your 
friend uses our friend finder tool to find more friends on Facebook, we 
may tell you about it to encourage you to use it as well. This of course 
means you friend may similarly see suggestions based on the things you 
do. But we will try to only show it to friends that could benefit from 
your experience. 
1.33 We may share your information in response to a legal request (like a 
search warrant, court order or subpoena) if we have a good faith belief 
that the law requires us to do so. This may include responding to legal 
requests from jurisdictions outside of the United States where we have a 
good faith belief that the response is required by law in that jurisdiction, 








1.34 If you give us your password while using Facebook friend finder, we 
will delete it after you upload your friends’ contact information. 
1.35 Cookies are small pieces of data that we store on your computer, mobile 
phone or other device to make Facebook easier to use, make our 
advertising better, and to protect you (and Facebook). For example, we 
may use them to know you are logged in to Facebook, to help you use 
social plugins and share buttons, or to know when you are interacting 
with our advertising or Platform partners. We may also ask advertisers 
to serve ads to computers, mobile phones or other devices with a cookie 
placed by Facebook (although we would not share any other 
information with that advertiser) 
1.36 Unless we make a change for legal or administrative reasons, or to 
correct an inaccurate statement, we will give you seven (7) days to 
provide us with comments on the change. If we receive more than 7000 
comments concerning a particular change, we will put the change up for 
a vote. The vote will be binding on us if more than 30% of all active 





 Notice and Awareness 
2.1 Registration information are editable through “Account Setting”. 
2.2 Information shared by you can be edited or removed through the 
“Edit/Remove” button at the top-right corner of the story box. 
2.3 You can control who can send you messages using your “How You 
Connect” settings. 
2.4 You can control whether we suggest that another user tag you in a photo 
using the “How Tags work” setting. 
2.5 You can control who can see the Facebook Pages you’ve “liked” by 
visiting your profile and clicking “Edit Profile”. 
2.6 Whenever you add thing to your profile you can select a specific 
audience, or even customize your audience. To do this, simply click on 
the sharing icon and choose who can see it. 
2.7 The “Apps you use” setting lets you control the applications you use. 







as the last time an application accessed your information. You can also 
remove applications you no longer want, or turn off all platform 
application. 
2.8 You can download a copy of everything you’ve put into Facebook by 
visiting our “Account Setting” and clicking on “Download a copy of 
your Facebook data”. 
2.9 We may send you notifications and other messages using the contact 
information we have for you, like your email address. You can control 
most of the notifications you receive, including ones from pages you like 
and applications you use, using your “Notifications” setting. 
2.10 If someone tags you in a post you can choose whether you want that post 
to appear on your profile. If you approve a post and later change your 
mind, you can remove it from your profile. 
2.11 Your Public Search setting controls whether people who enter your name 
on a public search engine may see your public profile (including in 
sponsored results). You can find your Public Search setting on the 
“Apps and Websites” setting page.  
2.12 If you decide that you do not want to experience instant personalization 
for all partner sites, you can disable instant personalization from the 






Notice and Awareness 
 
3.1 We use the information we receive about you with connection with the 
services and features we provide to you and other users like your 
friends, the advertisers that purchase ads on the site, and the developers 
that build the games, applications, and websites you use. 
3.2 Sometimes we get data from our advertising partners, customers and 
other third parties that help us (or them) deliver ads, understand online 
activity, and generally make Facebook better. 
3.3 Your birthday allows us to do things like show you age-appropriate 
content and advertisements. 
3.4 We may get your GPS location so we can tell you if any of your friends 
are nearby. 







another site in order to measure the effectiveness of-and improve the 
quality of those ads. 
3.6 We may put together data about you to determine which friends we 
should show you in your News Feed or suggest you tags in the photos 
you post. 
3.7 We may put together your current city with GPS and other location 
information we have about you to, for example, tell you and your friends 
about people or events nearby, or offer deals to you that you might be 
interested in. 
3.8 We may also put together data about you to serve you ads that might be 
more relevant to you. 
3.9 Granting us the permission to use the information we receive about you 
not only allows us to provide Facebook as it exists today, but it also 
allows us to provide you with innovative features and services we 
develop in the future that use the information.  
3.10 If you choose to hide your gender, it only hides it on your profile. This is 
because we just like the applications you and your friends use; need to 
use your gender to refer to you properly on the site. 
3.11 When you go to a game or application, or connect with a website using 
Facebook Platform, we give the game, application or website your User 
ID, as well as your friends’ User IDs (or your friend list). Your friend 
list helps the application make your experience more social because it 
lets you find your friends on that application. 
3.12 Your User ID helps the application personalize your experience because 
it can connect your account on that application with your Facebook 
account, and it can access your public information. This includes 
information you choose to make public, as well as information that is 
always publicly available. 
3.13 Age range lets applications provide you with age-appropriate content. 
Locale lets applications know what language you speak. Gender lets 
applications refer to you correctly. 
3.14 One of your friends might want to use a music application that allows 







that application, your friend would want to give the application her 
friend list that includes your User ID so the application knows which of 
her friends is also using it. 
3.15 Instant personalization is a way for Facebook to help partner sites such 
as Bing and Rotten Tomatoes create a more personalized and social 
experience than a social plugin can offer. 
3.16 When you visit and instant personalization site, we provide the site with 
your User ID and your friend list (as well as your age range, locale, and 
gender). The site can then connect your account on that site with your 
friends’ accounts to make the site instantly social. The site can also 
access public information with any of the User IDs it receives, which it 
can use to make the site instantly personalized. 
3.17 For example, if the site is a music site, it can access your music interests 
to suggest songs you may like, and access your friends' music interests 
to let you know what they are listening to. Of course it can only access 
you or your friends’ music interests if they are public.  
3.18 We like to tell you about some of the features your friends use on 
Facebook to help you have a better experience. For example, if your 
friend uses our friend finder tool to find more friends on Facebook, we 
may tell you about it to encourage you to use it as well. This of course 
means your   friend may similarly see suggestions based on the things 
you do. But we will try to only show it to friends that could benefit from 
your experience. 
3.19 Cookies are small pieces of data that we store on your computer, mobile 
phone or other device to make Facebook easier to use, make our 
advertising better, and to protect you (and Facebook). For example, we 
may use them to know you are logged in to Facebook, to help you use 
social plugins and share buttons, or to know when you are interacting 
with our advertising or Platform partners. We may also ask advertisers 
to serve ads to computers, mobile phones or other devices with a cookie 
placed by Facebook (although we would not share any other information 
with that advertiser). 







provide the services we offer. For example, we may use outside vendors 
to help host our website, serve photos and videos, process payments, or 
provide search results. In some cases we provide the service jointly with 
another company, such as the Facebook Marketplace. 
3.21 Some types of posts are always public posts. As a general rule, you 
should assure that if you do not see a sharing icon, the information will 
be publicly available. 
3.22 Your public information can show up when someone does a search on 
Facebook or on a public search engine 
3.23 Your public information will be accessible to the games, applications, 
and websites you and your friends use. 
3.24 Your public information will be accessible to anyone who uses our APIs 
such as our Graph API. 
3.25 We give your information to the people and companies that help us 
provide the services we offer. For example, we may use outside vendors 
to help host our website, serve photos and videos, process payments, or 
provide search results. In some cases we provide the service jointly with 
another company, such as the Facebook Marketplace. 
3.26  If you give us your password while using Facebook friend finder, we 
will delete it after you upload your friends’ contact information. 
3.27 We may also share information when we have a good faith belief it is 
necessary to: detect, prevent and address fraud and other illegal activity; 
to protect ourselves and you from violations of our Statement of Rights 
and Responsibilities; and to prevent death or imminent bodily harm. 
3.28  If the advertiser chooses to run the ad, we serve the ad to people who 
meet the criteria the advertiser selected, but we do not tell the advertiser 
who any of those people are. 
 he ad runs, we provide advertisers with reports on how their ads performed. For 
example we give advertisers reports telling them how many users saw or clicked 
on their ads. But these reports are anonymous. We do not tell advertisers who saw 
or clicked on their ads. 












Choice and Consent 
have: received your permission, given you notice, such as by telling you 
about it in this policy; or removed your name or any other personally 
identifying information from it. 
4.2 If you tag someone, that person and their friends can see your post no 
matter what audience you selected. The same is true when you approve a 
tag someone else adds to your post.  
4.3 When you comment on or “like” someone else’s post, or write on their 
wall, that person gets to select the audience. 
4.4 We only provide data to our advertising partners or customers after we 
have removed your name or any other personally indemnifying 
information from it, or have combined it with other people’s data in a 
way that it is no longer associated with you. 
4.5 When others share information about you, they can also choose to make 
it public. 
4.6 Choose the public icon if you want to make something public. Choosing 
to make something public is exactly what it sounds like.it means that 
anyone, including people off of Facebook, will be able to see or access 
it. 
4.7 Choose “Friends” icon if you want things you added to your profile to be 
shared with your Facebook friends. 
4.8 Choose “Customize” icon if you want to customize your audience. You 
can also use this to hide the item on your profile from specific people. 
4.9 Your friend list is always available to the games, applications and 
websites you use no matter what audience you have chosen for your 
friend list. Your friendship may also be visible elsewhere such as your 
friends’ profiles or searches. 
4.10 If you select “Only Me” as the audience for your friend list, but your 
friend sets her friend list to “Public”, anyone will be able to see your 
connection on your friend’s profile. 
4.11 If you share your contact information (such as your email address or 
mobile number) with your friends, they may be able to use third party 
applications to sync that information with other address books, including 







4.12 Some things (like your name and profile picture) do not have sharing 
icons because they are always publicly available. As a general rule you 
should assume that if you do not see sharing icon, the information will 
be publicly available. 
4.13 If you do not want someone to tag you and they refused not to do so, you 
can block them. This will prevent them from tagging you going forward.  
4.14 If you are tagged in a private space (such as a message or a group) only 
the people who can see the private space can see the tag. Similarly, if 
you are tagged in a comment, only the people who can see the comment 
can see the tag. 
4.15 Because pages are public, information you share with a page is public 
information. This means, for example, that if you post a comment on a 
page, that comment can be used by the page owner off of Facebook, and 
anyone can see it. 
4.16 If the application needs additional information other than your public 
information and those you choose to make public, it will have to ask you 
for specific permission. 
4.17 If you do not want applications to receive information about you, you 
can turn off all Facebook applications using your “Privacy Settings”. 
4.18 Sometimes a game console, mobile phone, or other device might ask for 
permission to share specific information with the games and applications 
you use on that device such as your public information). If you say okay, 
those applications will not be able to access any other information about 
you without asking specific permission from you or your friends. 
4.19 Instant personalization sites receive your User ID and friend list when 
you visit them. 
4.20 Your friends and the other people you share information with often want 
to share your information with applications to make their experiences on 
those applications more personalized and social. 
4.21 Your friends might want to share the music you “like” on Facebook. If 
you have made that information public, then the application can access it 
just like anyone else. But if you have shared your likes with just your 








4.22 You can control most of the information other people can share with 
application s from the “Apps and Website” settings page. But these 
controls do not let you limit access to your public information and friend 
list. 
4.23 When you log in to a website using your Facebook, we give the site your 
User ID, but we do not share your email address or password with that 
website. 
4.24 If you make something public using a plugin, such a posting a public 
comment on a newspaper’s website, then that website can access your 
comment (along with your User ID) just like everyone else. 
4.25 When you visit a site using instant personalization, it will know some 
information about you and your friends the moment you arrive. This is 
because instant personalization sites can access your User ID, your 
friend list, and your public information. 
4.26 The first time you visit an instant personalization site, you will see a 
notification letting you know that the site has partnered with Facebook to 
provide a personalized experience. The notification will give you the 
ability to disable or turn off instant personalization for that site. If you do 
that, that site is required to delete all of the information about you it 
received from Facebook. In addition, we will prevent that site from 
accessing your information in the future, even when your friends use that 
site. 
4.27 If you turn off an instant personalization site after you have been using it 
or visited it a few times (or after you have given it specific permission to 
access you data, it will not automatically delete your data. But the site is 
contractually required to delete your data if you ask it to. 
4.28 The partner is also contractually required not to use your User ID for a 
purpose (other than associating it with your account) until you and your 
friends visit the site. 
4.29 If the instant personalization site wants any additional information, it 
will have to get your specific permission. 







course, you give us permission.) 
4.31 Facebook Ads are sometimes paired with social actions your friends 
have taken. For example, an ad for a sushi restaurant may be paired with 
a news story that one of your friends likes that restaurant’s Facebook 
page. 
4.32 When you show up in one of these news stories, we will only pair it with 
ads shown to your friends. If you do not want to appear in stories paired 
with Facebook ads, you can opt out using your “ Edit social ads” setting. 
4.33 We may serve ads with social context (or serve just social context) on 
other sites. These work just like the ads we serve on Facebook-the 
advertisers do not receive any of your information. 
4.34 We sometimes allow business or anyone else to sponsor stories like the 
ones that show up in your news Feed, subject to the audience set for that 
story. While these are sponsored, they are different from ads because 
they don’t contain a message from the person that sponsored them. Your 
friends will see these stories even if you have opted out of the “Show my 
social actions in Facebook Ads” setting. 
4.35 Your “Show my social action in Facebook Ads” setting does not control 
ads about Facebook’s services and features. 
4.36 Games, applications and websites can serve ads directly to you if they 
have your User ID. 
4.37 Many of the things you do on Facebook (like "liking" a Page) are posted 
to your Wall and shared in News Feed. But there's a lot to read in News 
Feed. That's why we allow people to "sponsor" your stories to make sure 
your friends see them. For example, if you RSVP to an event hosted by a 
local restaurant, that restaurant may want to make sure your friends see it 
so they can come too. If they do sponsor a story, that story will appear in 
the same place ads usually do under the heading "Sponsored Stories" or 
something similar. Only people that could originally see the story can 
see the sponsored story, and no personal information about you (or your 
friends) is shared with the sponsor. 
4.38 We like to tell you about some of the features your friends use on 







friend uses our friend finder tool to find more friends on Facebook, we 
may tell you about it to encourage you to use it as well. This of course 
means your friend may similarly see suggestions based on the things you 
do. But we will try to only show it to friends that could benefit from your 
experience. 
4.39 We may share your information in response to a legal request (like a 
search warrant, court order or subpoena) if we have a good faith belief 
that the law requires us to do so. This may include responding to legal 
requests from jurisdictions outside of the United States where we have a 
good faith belief that the response is required by law in that jurisdiction, 
affects users in that jurisdiction, and is consistent with internationally 
recognized standards. 
4.40 Unless we make a change for legal or administrative reasons, or to 
correct an inaccurate statement, we will give you seven (7) days to 
provide us with comments on the change. If we receive more than 7000 
comments concerning a particular change, we will put the change up for 
a vote. The vote will be binding on us if more than 30% of all active 















5.1 If you do not want your information to be accessible through out APIs, 
you can turn off all platform applications from your Privacy Settings. 
5.2 Choose “Friends” icon if you want things you added to your profile to be 
shared with your Facebook friends. 
5.3 Choose “Customize” icon if you want to customize your audience. You 
can also use this to hide the item on your profile from specific people. 
5.4 Your friend list is always available to the games, applications and 
websites you use no matter what audience you have chosen for your 
friend list. Your friendship may also be visible elsewhere such as your 
friends’ profiles or searches. 
5.5 If you select “Only Me” as the audience for your friend list, but your 
friend sets her friend list to “Public”, anyone will be able to see your 
connection on your friend’s profile. 























Integrity and Security 
5.7 If someone tags you in a post you can choose whether you want that post 
to appear on your profile. If you approve a post and later change your 
mind, you can remove it from your profile. 
5.8 To make it easier for your friends to find you, we allow anyone with 
contact information (such as your email address and mobile number), to 
find you through Facebook search, as well as other tools we provide, 
such as contact importers. 
5.9 If you share your contact information (such as your email address or 
mobile number) with your friends, they may be able to use third party 
applications to sync that information with other address books, including 
ones on their mobile phones. 
5.10 Some things (like your name and profile picture) do not have sharing 
icons because they are always publicly available. As a general rule you 
should assume that if you do not see sharing icon, the information will 
be publicly available. 
5.11 If you do not want someone to tag you and they refused not to do so, you 
can block them. This will prevent them from tagging you going forward.  
5.12 If you are tagged in a private space (such as a message or a group) only 
the people who can see the private space can see the tag. Similarly, if 
you are tagged in a comment, only the people who can see the comment 
can see the tag. 
5.13 Your friends can add you to the groups they are in. you can always leave 
a group, which will prevent others from adding you to it again. 
5.14 When you “like” a page, you create a connection to that page. That 
connection is added to your profile and your friends may see it in their 
News Feeds. 
5.15 You can remove the pages you have “liked” from your profile. 
5.16 Some pages contain content that comes directly from the page owner. 
Because this content comes directly form the page owner, that page may 
be able to collect information about you, just like any website. 
5.17 Facebook games, applications and websites are created and maintained 
by other business and developers who are not part of Facebook, so you 








5.18 When you go to a game or application, or connect with a website using 
Facebook Platform, we give the game, application or website your User 
ID, as well as your friends’ User IDs (or your friend list). Your friend list 
helps the application make your experience more social because it lets 
you find your friends on that application. 
5.19 If the application needs additional information other than your public 
information and those you choose to make public, it will have to ask you 
for specific permission. 
5.20 The “Apps you use” setting lets you control the applications you use. 
You can see the permissions you have given these applications, as well 
as the last time an application accessed your information. You can also 
remove applications you no longer want, or turn off all platform 
application. 
5.21 When you turn all platform applications off, your User ID is no longer 
given to applications, even when your friends use those applications. But 
you will no longer be able to use any games, applications or websites 
through Facebook. 
5.22 If you do not want applications to receive information about you, you 
can turn off all Facebook applications using your “Privacy Settings”. 
5.23 Instant personalization sites receive your User ID and friend list when 
you visit them. 
5.24 Your friends and the other people you share information with often want 
to share your information with applications to make their experiences on 
those applications more personalized and social. 
5.25 Your friends might want to share the music you “like” on Facebook. If 
you have made that information public, then the application can access it 
just like anyone else. But if you have shared your likes with just your 
friends, the application could ask your friend for permission to share 
them. 
5.26 You can control most of the information other people can share with 
application s from the “Apps and Website” settings page. But these 








5.27 If you want to completely block applications from getting your 
information, you will need to turn off all platform applications. This 
means that you will no longer be able to use any games, applications or 
websites. 
5.28 If an application asks permission from someone else to access your 
information, the application will be allowed to use that information only 
in connection with the person that gave the permission and no one else. 
5.29 If you already have an account on a website, the site may be able to 
connect that account with your Facebook account. Sometimes it does 
this using what is called an “email hash”, which is similar to searching 
for someone on Facebook using an email address. Only the email 
addresses in this case are encrypted so no email addresses are actually 
shared between Facebook and the website. 
5.30 When you log in to a website using your Facebook, we give the site your 
User ID, but we do not share your email address or password with that 
website 
5.31 We receive data when you visit a site with a social plugin. We keep this 
data for 90 days. After that, we remove your name or any other 
personally identifying information from the data, or combine it with 
other people’s data in a way that it is no longer associated with you. 
5.32 When you visit a site using instant personalization, it will know some 
information about you and your friends the moment you arrive. This is 
because instant personalization sites can access your User ID, your 
friend list, and your public information. 
5.33 The first time you visit an instant personalization site, you will see a 
notification letting you know that the site has partnered with Facebook to 
provide a personalized experience. The notification will give you the 
ability to disable or turn off instant personalization for that site. If you do 
that, that site is required to delete all of the information about you it 
received from Facebook. In addition, we will prevent that site from 








5.34 If you decide that you do not want to experience instant personalization 
for all partner sites, you can disable instant personalization from the 
“Apps and Websites” settings page. 
5.35 If you turn off an instant personalization site after you have been using it 
or visited it a few times (or after you have given it specific permission to 
access you data, it will not automatically delete your data. But the site is 
contractually required to delete your data if you ask it to. 
5.36 To join the instant personalization program, a potential partner must 
enter into an agreement with us designed to protect your privacy. For 
example, this agreement requires that the partner delete your data if you 
turn off instant personalization when you first visit the site. It also 
prevent from accessing any information about you until you or your 
friends visit the site. 
5.37 Instant personalization partners sometimes use an email hash process to 
see if any of their users are on Facebook and get those users’ User IDs. 
This process is similar to searching for someone of Facebook using an 
email address, except in this case the email addresses are encrypted so 
no actual email addresses are exchanged. 
5.38 The partner is also contractually required not to use your User ID for an 
purpose (other than associating it with your account) until you and your 
friends visit the site. 
5.39 When you visit and instant personalization site, we provide the site with 
your User ID and your friend list  (as well as your age range, locale, and 
gender). The site can then connect your account on that site with your 
friends’ accounts to make the site instantly social. The site can also 
access public information with any of the User IDs it receives, which it 
can use to make the site instantly personalized. 
5.40 For example, if the site is a music site, it can access your music interests 
to suggest songs you may like, and access your friends' music interests to 
let you know what they are listening to. Of course it can only access you 
or your friends’ music interests if they are public.  
5.41 Your Public Search setting controls whether people who enter your name 







sponsored results). You can find your Public Search setting on the “Apps 
and Websites” setting page. 
5.42 In the advertiser chooses to run the ad, we serve the ad to people who 
meet the criteria the advertiser selected, but we do not tell the advertiser 
who any of those people are. 
5.43 After the ad runs, we provide advertisers with reports on how their ads 
performed. For example we give advertisers reports telling them how 
many users saw or clicked on their ads. But these reports are anonymous. 
We do not tell advertisers who saw or clicked on their ads. 
5.44 We take safety issues very seriously, especially with children, and we 
encourage parents to teach their children about safe internet practices. To 
learn more visit our Safety Center. 
5.45 To protect minors, we may put special safeguards in place (such as 
placing restriction on the ability of adults to share and connect with 
them),, recognizing this may provide minors with a more limited 
experience on Facebook. 
5.46 Facebook complies with the EU Safe Harbor framework as set forth by 
the Department of Commerce regarding the collection, use and retention 
of data from European Union. As part of our participation in the safe 
Harbor, we agree to resolve all disputes you have with us in connection 
with our policies and practices through TRUSTe. 
5.47 If you give us your password while using Facebook friend finder, we 
will delete it after you upload your friends’ contact information. 
5.48 We do our best to keep your information secure, but we need your help. 
For more detailed information about staying safe on Facebook, visit the 
Facebook Security page. 
5.49 Unless we make a change for legal or administrative reasons, or to 
correct an inaccurate statement, we will give you seven (7) days to 
provide us with comments on the change. If we receive more than 7000 
comments concerning a particular change, we will put the change up for 
a vote. The vote will be binding on us if more than 30% of all active 
registered users as of the date of the notice vote. 







in your browser), but it may affect your ability to use Facebook. Learn 
more at: https://www.facebook.com/help/?page=176591669064814 . 
5.51 We offer tools to help you upload your friends’ contact information so 
that you can find your friends on Facebook, and invite friends who do 
not use Facebook to join. If you do not want us to store this information, 
visit this help page at: 
https://www/facebook.com/contact_importer/remove_uploads.php 
5.52 If a user deceases we may close an account if we receive a formal 







6.1 If you want to see information available about you throughout Graph 
API, just type https://graph.facebook.com/ [User ID or 
Username]?metadata=1 into your browser. 
6.2 Facebook games, applications and websites are created and maintained 
by other business and developers who are not part of Facebook, so you 
should always make sure to read their term of service and privacy 
policies. 
6.3 You can preview your public profile at: http://www.facebook.com/[Your 
Username or UserID]?p 
6.4 You can learn more about how to request a search engine to remove you 
from cached information at: http://www.facebook.com/help/?faq=13323 
6.5 Try this tool to see one of the was advertisers target ads and what 
information they see at: http://www.facebook.com/ads/create/ 
6.6 Advertisers sometimes place cookies on your computer in order to make 
their ads more effective. Learn more at: 
http://networkadvertising.org/managing/opt_out.asp. 
6.7 Learn what happens when you click “Like” on an advertisement or an 
advertiser’s Facebook Page at: 
https://www.facebook.com/help/?faq=19399 
6.8 We take safety issues very seriously, especially with children, and we 
encourage parents to teach their children about safe internet practices. To 
learn more visit our Safety Center. 







framework, visit the U.S Department of Commerce’s Safe Harbor 
website at: https://safeharbor.export.gov/list.aspx. 
6.10 You can report a deceased person's profile 
at: https://www.facebook.com/help/contact.php?show_form=deceased . 
6.11 If we make changes to this Privacy Policy we will notify you by 
publication here and on the Facebook Site Governance Page. If the 
changes are material, we will provide you additional, prominent notice 
as appropriate under the circumstances. You can make sure that you 









7.1 If you have given a game, application, or website permission to post 
information on your wall, you can remove it from your “Apps you use” 
setting. 
7.2 You can control who can send you messages using your “How You 
Connect” settings. 
7.3 You can control who can see the Facebook Pages you’ve “liked” by 
visiting your profile and clicking “Edit Profile”. 
7.4 We provide initial responses to access requests within a reasonable 
period of time, typically within thirty days. 
7.5 You can download a copy of everything you’ve put into Facebook by 
visiting our “Account Setting” and clicking on “Download a copy of 





Notice and Awareness 
8.1 If the ownership of our business changes, we may transfer your 
information to the new owner so they can continue to operate the 
services. But they will still have to honor the commitments we have 
made in this privacy policy. 
8.2 If you are a resident of or have your principal place of business in the US 
or Canada, this Statement is an agreement between you and Facebook, 
Inc.  Otherwise, this Statement is an agreement between you and 
Facebook Ireland Limited.  References to “us,” “we,” and “our” mean 
either Facebook, Inc. or Facebook Ireland Limited, as appropriate. 
8.3 This Statement makes up the entire agreement between the parties 








Appendix III. Study Questionnaire 
Pre-Study Questions 
 
1. I am:     ☐ Female     ☐ Male    
 
2. What is your age?  Age________ 
 
3. What discipline are you in? 
☐ Management Sciences                                            ☐ Computer Science  
☐ Mechanical                                                              Other (Specify): ______________ 
 
4. Do you have a Facebook account? 
  ☐ Yes     ☐ No    
 
5. How familiar are you with privacy policies (Privacy regulations about gathering, use 





















































        ☐                      ☐                   ☐                  ☐                  ☐                  ☐                  ☐ 







☐ 1 - I have never read it before 
☐ 2 - I have glanced at it                                    
☐ 3 - I have read some parts of it                             
☐ 4 - I have read it all 
                  
7. If you answered “Yes” to the above question, what was the level of your 
understanding? 
☐ I have not understood any of it.  
☐ I understood most of it but not all. 
☐ I have understood all of it. 
 
8. Do you ever use Facebook collaboratively with your friends in public places (An 
example would be browsing pictures and checking news or events with your friends 
in a coffee shop or in a public library)?     
☐ Yes     ☐ No     ☐Depends. Explain:  ______________    
 
9. Has someone ever looked over your shoulder while you were using Facebook? 
 
  ☐ Yes     ☐No     ☐Maybe, but I haven’t noticed. 
 
10. If you answered “Yes” to question 8, how many times per day/week/month/year 















Q2) Did you find the “Blur Messages” option easy to find? 
☐ Yes       ☐No                   ☐ I didn’t use it  
 
Q3) If you answered “Yes” to the above question, how much did this feature make you aware 






























          ☐                             ☐                               ☐                              ☐                            ☐ 
 
Q4) How much do you think the invisible touch is helpful to avoid information theft in public 



























































          ☐                     ☐                  ☐                  ☐                  ☐                   ☐                 ☐ 
 
Q5-Interview) How do you think this technique can be improved to give users more control 










Q7) How much do you think the warning message was informative and helpful in 





























































Q8) How much did this feature make you aware and conscious of being in a public place and 

























































          ☐                         ☐                                ☐                              ☐                               ☐ 
 





Q10) How much do you think the Passgesture is helpful to avoid information theft in public 





























































Q11-Interview) How do you think this technique can be improved to give users more control 




Q12) The type of user agreement being presented in Task 2 is a short targeted type of user 
agreement called Just-in-time-click-through-agreement. How effective did you find this 
























































         ☐                      ☐                  ☐                  ☐                   ☐                 ☐                   ☐ 
 
Task 3  
 




Q14) Was the little “Slide to right” note on the message bar helpful in understanding what to 
do? 








Q15) How much do you think the warning message was helpful and informative about your 





















































        ☐                       ☐                  ☐                  ☐                  ☐                  ☐                   ☐ 
 
Q16) How effective was this feature in making you aware and conscious of being in a public 
























































        ☐                       ☐                  ☐                  ☐                  ☐                  ☐                   ☐ 
 





Q18) How helpful do you think the slide-to-reveal technique is to avoid information theft in 



























































         ☐                      ☐                  ☐                  ☐                  ☐                  ☐                  ☐ 
 
Q19-Interview) How do you think this technique can be improved to give users more control 
over their personal information?  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Q20) On a scale of 1 to 7, how effective was the slide-to-reveal technique to make you read 
























































         ☐                      ☐                  ☐                  ☐                  ☐                  ☐                   ☐ 
 
Task 4  
 
Q21) How helpful were the arrows at the corner of the page in communicating that you can 



























































        ☐                       ☐                  ☐                  ☐                  ☐                  ☐                  ☐ 
 




Q23) How effective was this feature in making you aware and conscious of being in a public 
























































         ☐                      ☐                   ☐                 ☐                  ☐                   ☐                  ☐ 
 
Q24) How helpful do you think the Semantic Zoom for users to control their personal 



























































        ☐                       ☐                  ☐                  ☐                  ☐                  ☐                   ☐ 
 
Q25-Interview) How do you think this technique can be improved to give users more control 














Q28) Did you notice the red triangle appeared when I started using the table? 








Q29) If you answered “Yes” to the above question, how effective do you think this technique 
is in making users more conscious when another person starts using the same table in a 
























































        ☐                       ☐                  ☐                  ☐                  ☐                  ☐                   ☐ 
 
 
Q30) Did you notice the “Log off” button at the top right corner of the page? 
☐ Yes      ☐No       ☐Not Sure 
 
Q31) If you answered “Yes” to the above question, how effective do you think the design 
and placement of the “Log off” button was in making the user more aware about logging off 
































































Q32) On a scale of 1 to7, how effective do you think the pop-up menu was in giving you 
























































        ☐                       ☐                  ☐                  ☐                  ☐                  ☐                   ☐ 
  
Q33-Interview) How do you think this technique can be improved to give users more control 









Appendix IX. Statistical Calculations 
 
Q2) 


















Frequency statistics for Q2 
Hypothesis test summary for Q2 



























Hypothesis test summary for Q3 





























Descriptive analysis for Q4 
Frequency analysis for Q4 
Hypothesis test summary for Q4 






























Descriptive analysis for Q7 
Frequency analysis for Q7 
Hypothesis test summary for Q7 





























Descriptive analysis for Q8 
Frequency analysis for Q8 
Hypothesis test summary for Q8 





























Descriptive analysis for Q10 
Frequency analysis for Q10 
Hypothesis test summary for Q10 




























Descriptive analysis for Q12 
Frequency analysis for Q12 
Hypothesis test summary for Q12 































Descriptive analysis for Q14 
Frequency analysis for Q14 
Hypothesis test summary for Q14 




























Descriptive analysis for Q15 
Frequency analysis for Q15 
Hypothesis test summary for Q15 



























Descriptive analysis for Q16 
Frequency analysis for Q16 
Hypothesis test summary for Q16 

























Descriptive analysis for Q18 
Frequency analysis for Q18 
Hypothesis test summary for Q18 


























Descriptive analysis for Q20 
Frequency analysis for Q20 
Hypothesis test summary for Q20 






























Descriptive analysis for Q21 
Frequency analysis for Q21 
Hypothesis test summary for Q21 




























Descriptive analysis for Q23 
Frequency analysis for Q23 
Hypothesis test summary for Q23 
































 Descriptive analysis for Q24 
 Frequency analysis for Q24 
Hypothesis test summary for Q24 





























Descriptive analysis for Q28 
Frequency analysis for Q28 
Hypothesis test summary for Q28 




























Descriptive analysis for Q29 
Frequency analysis for Q29 
Hypothesis test summary for Q29 























Descriptive analysis for Q30 





























Descriptive analysis for Q31 
Frequency analysis for Q31 
Hypothesis test summary for Q31 





























Descriptive analysis for Q32 
Frequency analysis for Q32 
Hypothesis test summary for Q32 











Task 1: A smart feature that can identify and search for words such as telephone number. If 
the first time we search for the message the whole message is blurry, there might be 
difficulties finding the information we are looking for. An algorithm to find some non-
confidential words and make them visible so that we can easier find the needed information 
 
Task 2: Instead of the passgetsure pattern we could ask user to write the word Cautious or 
Warning for example so that even if the user skipped reading the warning message, there will 
be still a good chance they become more aware about what they are doing. 
 
Task 3: It did its job very well. It made me read the whole message. The fact that I had to 
reveal the message line by line made me read all of it. But we have to make sure it does not 
take a long time otherwise users’ will be frustrated especially users that are not familiar with 
these types of techniques. 
 
Task 4: It is hard for user to know what to do. Although I have noticed the arrows at the 
corner I didn’t think doing gestures like pinching will change the level of presentation 
because I was not familiar with it before. If user can be informed about it, it may become 
more common in different applications. 
 
Task 5: I didn’t know what to do exactly and it could have been nice if some information 
were available about each of those option so that user does not press them accidently. For 







explaining thing and then when we pushed it, it asks whether we are sure to do that. Also it 




Task 1: I didn’t know about the feature and if there were a warning message for example 
that such an option is available it would have been easier for me to locate the option. Also pop-
up message can be frustrating some times but it would be more beneficial. 
Task 2: The only thing I can say is that because I was familiar with this technique similar to 
Android phones, I just made the pattern without reading the message. 
Task 3: The font of the text was not eye-catching but the technique was new for me and 
attracted me more. I read the whole message whereas the first one I just skipped it. 
Task 4: I noticed the arrows but I didn’t wan to use it because I thought it is going to make 
the screen bigger and I didn’t wan to do that because the small screen was giving me more 
privacy.  
Task 5: I only think options can be visible from the beginning and not to be that I have to 
discover them  
 
Participant 3: 
Task 1: I think it should have been activated by default so that user won’t enter into the 
message accidently with having everything revealed. And if the user didn’t want to blur the 
message they can deactivate the feature. This would be safer. 
Task 2: Making that gesture made me read the text and if it was only an Okay button I 
would possibly won’t read the message. It could be also that instead of making the gesture the 
user has to write a word. Because if users get used to it they can skip reading the message and 







Task 3: The problem was that the lines didn’t have any order and I started reading form 
the last line. Or something like the first line is darker and it gets lighter from line to line. It 
gets more user-friendly that way. 
Task 4: At first place it wasn’t clear for me there is a zooming feature. There should be 
a message or something telling the user there is such an option available. The arrows were 
small and were not noticeable. Again I think there should be a message saying there is a 
zooming option available for you. 
Task 5: I didn’t notice when the red triangle appeared and I didn’t use it. Again I think 
a message or a sound would be beneficial to notice. Although the message might be 
bothering but it can be an option to be shown only the first time and the user can set it not 
to appear the next time. 
 
Participant 4: 
Task 1: I think the main problem is that if you blur the text how you can find the 
information. If there was a fast way of revealing the message user can search for the 
information easier. 
Task 2: I think this task was totally okay and I had no problem with it. 
Task 3: At the beginning it was a little bit confusing but then I liked it and made me 
read the whole message. Whereas in task 2 I did not read the whole message. 
Task 4: If there were some hints available to tell the user what option is available and 
how to use it would have been better especially for the user who is not familiar with this 
technique. The arrows were too small.  
Task 5: Actually nothing comes to my mind 
 
Participant 5: 
Task 1: This technique was very interesting for me. Because I am very worried about 








Task 2: I read the message. It was a little confusing for me and I prefer putting the 
password of my account rather having challenging stuff. 
Task 3: It was time-consuming and I like the previous technique although I read the 
message in both tasks.  
Task 4: I noticed the arrows but I didn’t know what that means. I don’t have experience 
using these devices. Normally if I have something very confidential, I would not check it in 
public and rather go to a private place. 
Task 5: I think having a hardware shelter around the table would be beneficial so that not 





Task 1: It would be better to have a message or comment to give some idea what to do 
like “Touch any sentence to see it”.  Because many users like me are typical people with not so 
much technology experience. 
Task 2: I am a conservative person and don’t want my information to be visible. Therefore 
this technique was not advantageous to me because I never choose to for example switch to 
classic Facebook website. 
Task 3: Because it was the first time I read the whole message but if I get used to it I may 
just slide the bars rapidly and press okay. 
Task 4: When I started using this technique because I did not know what to do the arrows 
meant nothing for me. If the figure of the arrows would change to something else such as a 
picture of 2 fingers, it would be more informative. 
Task 5: About the log of button, I saw it but I did not pay attention or thought about using 







the table I was worried about you seeing my information and the first thing came to my 




Task 1: I saw the whole message before blurring it. If I haven’t seen it would be 
difficult for me to find the information and had to go back and forth to figure it out. 
Task 2: When I saw that page I felt like I am in a wrong place and it is going to ask me 
to log in again. It would have been nice if as soon as I entered the page a message pops up 
saying you are entering into a new area and we need another authentication or consent. 
Task 3: I think that this method was new made me read the whole message for the first 
time. But if I am going to use it in future I won’t read it any more and will know I just have 
to slide bars. Maybe coming up wit a new idea every time would be a solution. 
Task 4: If the arrows were in different color or bigger it would be better. Also a small 
notice that you can pinch to zoom in or zoom back will also be helpful. 
Task 5: I did not notice the border but I did notice the red triangle and when it appeared 
and made me curious. The log off button I noticed but it was not eye-catching. It was better 
if it was in different color. However, I still don’t think I would work with my sensitive 
information in public places because I still think people cans see it. Also I really liked to be 
able to resize my page. 
 
Participant 8: 
Task 1: It would be better to have a search tool so that if the user searches the 
telephone number, the number appears. 
Task 2: It is easier to put in a pin code instead of a pattern. 
Task 3: I really liked this technique better than the previous one and it made me read 







Task 4: I first thought it would change the font size and make it harder for people to see it. 
Task 5: I didn’t notice the red triangle. If it had something like an exclamation mark it 
would be more noticeable.  
 
Participant 9: 
Task 1: The problem was that if I had not seen the message I could not locate the 
telephone number. If there was a option to differentiate letters form numbers it would be 
helpful.  
Task 2: No specific suggestion comes to my mind. 
Task 3: The warning was stronger so I was not sure to press the okay button. I think if it 
had a back button it would be useful. 
Task 4: I like the technique a lot but I really did not get how it is going to help. 
Task 5: My concern is that what if I choose one of the options unintentionally. I was 
curious to see what it happens but you may not have been my friend. If it were a describing 
message about the feature it would be better. 
 
Participant 10: 
Task 1: Since I assumed I am in a public place I think the message should have been 
blurred by default but then I would have some problem finding information. Maybe having a 
search option looking up for numbers or keywords would be helpful. 
Task 2: I didn’t read the message and I do have Android cellphone. I normally click on 
buttons automatically and okay it and skip the message. 
Task 3: In this task I read the whole message. I am not very worried about privacy stuff 
and I found these technologies annoying. Also the sliding bar was a little tricky because it 
didn’t go all the way to the back and the okay button didn’t become activated although I read 







Task 4: It took me a while to notice the arrows. If they were a little bit bigger it would 
be better. Also it might have been because I have never seen it before. I needed some 
transition to tell me the page is changing. It was not obvious to me. 
Task 5: I noticed the triangle appeared when you joined the table. If someone sitting 
there I knew they can see my stuff and I didn’t need a notifier. If it is really confidential it 
shouldn’t be accessed in a public device. 
 
 
 
